DANIEL ADAM v. HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE
| APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY |
| Lord Justice Clerk Lord Penrose Lord Macfadyen | [2005HCJAC60] Appeal No: XC787/03 OPINION OF THE LORD JUSTICE CLERK in NOTE OF APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION by DANIEL McNEIL McGILL ADAM, otherwise known as DANIEL McNEIL ADAMS Appellant; against HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE Respondent: _______ |
Appellant: Shead, Lockie; Friel & Co., Glasgow
Respondent: Mitchell, Q.C., A.D.; Crown Agent
27 April 2005
[1]I agree with the Opinion of Lord Macfadyen.
| APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY |
| Lord Justice Clerk Lord Penrose Lord Macfadyen | [2005HCJAC60] Appeal No: XC787/03 OPINION OF LORD PENROSE in NOTE OF APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION by DANIEL McNEIL McGILL ADAM, otherwise known as DANIEL McNEIL ADAMS Appellant; against HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE Respondent: _______ |
Appellant: Shead, Lockie; Friel & Co., Glasgow
Respondent: Mitchell, Q.C., A.D.; Crown Agent
27 April 2005
[2]I agree with the Opinion delivered by Lord Macfadyen.
| APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY |
| Lord Justice Clerk Lord Penrose Lord Macfadyen | [2005HCJAC60] Appeal No: XC787/03 OPINION OF LORD MACFADYEN in NOTE OF APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION by DANIEL McNEIL McGILL ADAM, otherwise known as DANIEL McNEIL ADAMS Appellant; against HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE Respondent: _______ |
Appellant: Shead, Lockie; Friel & Co., Glasgow
Respondent: Mitchell, Q.C., A.D.; Crown Agent
27 April 2005
[3]The appellant, Daniel Adams, stood trial in the High Court sitting in Glasgow on an indictment containing two charges of murder, and one of assault and robbery. At the close of the Crown case, the Advocate depute withdrew the libel in respect of the charge of assault and robbery. On 2 June 2000 the jury by a majority found the appellant guilty of culpable homicide in respect of each of the murder charges. In so doing, they rejected the defence of insanity that had been advanced on the appellant's behalf, but accepted that on each occasion his responsibility was diminished.
[4]Following his conviction the appellant lodged a Note of Appeal against conviction in which one ground of appeal was advanced. In the course of subsequent procedure, three further grounds of appeal were added. This Opinion is concerned only with the fourth ground of appeal. The appeal will require to be continued for further procedure in relation to the other grounds of appeal.
[5]The appellant's fourth ground of appeal is in the following terms:
"The Trial Judge misdirected the Jury on the approach they should take to the question of reasonable doubt. The directions given were apt to suggest that the jury required to apply a more exacting standard than was necessary."
[6]The passage in the trial judge's charge in which she directed the jury on the meaning of reasonable doubt was in the following terms:
"Now, the second matter, ladies and gentlemen, which I have to direct you as a general direction in law is this business about 'beyond reasonable doubt'. That is, the Crown has to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Whenever I refer to the Crown satisfying you or proving something then I mean to the standard beyond reasonable doubt.
Now, what does reasonable doubt mean? Well, ladies and gentlemen, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof to a mathematical or scientific certainty. A trivial, hypothetical or far-fetched doubt would not prevent you from finding the accused guilty. A reasonable doubt is a doubt for which you can identify some sound, logical reason. It is often said that it is the sort of doubt which, if it affected a matter of importance in your own life, would cause you to pause and reconsider.
So if, having heard the whole evidence, you are left with a reasonable doubt as to whether the Crown has proved the guilt of an accused you must acquit him."
[7]The submission made on the appellant's behalf by Mr Shead was brief. It was focused exclusively on the words "and reconsider" which appear at the end of the second paragraph of the passage quoted in paragraph [ ] above. The submission was that, while authority supported, as a sound direction, the proposition that reasonable doubt was the sort of doubt which, if it affected a matter of importance in a juror's own life, would cause him or her to pause or hesitate, it was wrong to add the words "and reconsider", because they imposed too exacting a standard for the identification of a reasonable doubt.
[8]The Advocate depute submitted that there was no merit in this ground of appeal. The words used by the trial judge were not materially different from those which had been approved in previous cases. It was legitimate to refer to a doubt which would cause a juror, in a matter of importance in his or her own life, to "pause" or "hesitate" and "reflect" or "reconsider". There was therefore no misdirection in the present case.
[9]It is possible, in my opinion, to dispose of this ground of appeal very briefly. Accepting, as the appellant did, that it is legitimate to direct a jury that reasonable doubt is the sort of doubt that would cause a juror, in a matter of importance in his or her own life, to pause or hesitate (see, for example, MacDonald v H.M. Advocate 1995 SCCR 663, per Lord Justice Clerk Ross at 671B), the only issue raised on the appellant's behalf is whether the addition of the words "and reconsider" altered the standard in a sense adverse to the appellant. This case is, in my opinion, distinguishable from cases such as MacDonald, Buchanan v H.M. Advocate 1997 SCCR 441 and A v H.M. Advocate 2003 SCCR 154 , in which the additional words used implied that a reasonable doubt was one which would dissuade the juror from a particular course of action. Considering the language used by the trial judge in the present case, I can see no sensible purpose that would be served by a pause or hesitation other than that it should afford the opportunity for further thought; for "reconsideration" of, "reflection" upon or "review" of the situation. I am therefore of opinion that to articulate that point by the introduction of the words "and reconsider" into the sentence in question made no material difference to the sense of the direction. Those words did not, in my opinion, set an unduly high standard for reasonable doubt and thus lower the standard of proof incumbent on the Crown. In my view that is clearly so when the words which Mr Shead sought to criticise are read, as they ought to be, as part of the whole passage in the charge dealing with reasonable doubt. They therefore did not constitute a misdirection.
[10]In my opinion, therefore, the directions given by the trial judge on the subject of reasonable doubt were unobjectionable, and the fourth ground of appeal therefore falls to be rejected.