APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE BY JOHN RICHARD HAUGEN AGAINST HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE
APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
[2015] HCJAC 121
HCA/2015/3352/XC
Lord Justice Clerk
Lord Bracadale
Lord Malcolm
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD CARLOWAY, the LORD JUSTICE CLERK
in
APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE
by
JOHN RICHARD HAUGEN
Appellant;
against
HER MAJESTY’S ADVOCATE
Respondent:
Appellant: Jackson QC; Paterson Bell
Respondent: McSporran AD; the Crown Agent
4 December 2015
[1] On 2 September 2015, at the High Court in Glasgow, the appellant pled guilty, under the procedure set out in section 76 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, to a charge which libelled that:
“on 14 May 2015 at the house occupied by you at ... Cowal Drive, Linwood you ... did assault Grace Kissell, formerly residing at ... Cowal Drive, Linwood and did seize her by the neck, threaten to slit her throat and repeatedly strike her on the head and body with a knife ... and you did murder her.”
On 29 September, he was sentenced to life imprisonment with a punishment part of 19 years. That period was discounted from a headline figure of 22 years.
[2] There was an agreed narrative. The appellant had been friendly with the deceased’s sister whilst they had been both serving in the Army. The appellant and the deceased became friends. The deceased was 32 years of age and lived with her 12 year old daughter in Linwood. She ran her own child minding business. Although she lived at a different address, the deceased had a tenancy of a property in Cowal Drive. After the appellant had left the Army, he took up residence in that property. It is not entirely clear what the financial arrangements were, but they involved the appellant making substantial payments of rent and Council Tax direct to the deceased’s accounts with the relevant authorities. At some point, the appellant considered that the deceased owed him several thousand pounds. In the period of two months prior to the murder, the deceased and the appellant exchanged text messages, suggesting an escalating dispute, perhaps over the assignation of the tenancy and perhaps over a loan of money or both. On the morning of 14 May, there were further text messages indicating that, whatever the dispute was, it was reaching a crisis point.
[3] Shortly after 1.00pm, the deceased drove to the house in Cowal Drive, then occupied by the appellant. Some 10 minutes later she sent a text to a friend stating that she was having an argument with the appellant, he had assaulted her and had threatened to kill her, by cutting throat. However, the deceased told her friend that she was “fine”. This was clearly not the case.
[4] Shortly thereafter, the appellant stabbed the deceased some 27 times; 16 of those were to the back, 10 to the front and 1 to the right forearm. Some of the wounds had penetrated the heart. Considerable force had been used. Not long after the attack, the appellant had called his father to say that he had “just killed somebody”. He also called his sister and told her that the deceased had come round and started to cause trouble. He had asked the deceased to leave, but she would not go. He said that she had “kicked off”. He had picked up a kitchen knife and stabbed her. The appellant made an emergency services call at about 2.30. He told the operator that he wished to report a crime as he had just committed a murder.
[5] The appellant’s personal circumstances were that he was 41 years of age; he is single and worked as a service delivery driver at the airport. He had previously been in the Army for some 16 years, and undertook tours in Northern Ireland and Iraq. He had left the Army in 2013 as a result of a hearing disability. He continued to serve in the Territorial Army. He had minor previous convictions for road traffic offences. There was no suggestion that he had any mental health problems. He had expressed some remorse at what he had done, especially relative to the effect which the deceased’s death would have had on her young daughter.
[6] There is no doubt that, as the judge reports, this was a “frenzied attack of a most brutal nature”, which required the imposition of a substantial punishment part attached to the life sentence. However, as was submitted in the course of the appeal, the appellant has no significant criminal record. The murder was not premeditated, nor did it involve taking a weapon into the public arena. The appellant made no attempt to conceal the crime and telephoned the police shortly after the incident. There were no other offences involved with the crime. There was a degree of remorse expressed.
[7] Having regard to HM Advocate v Boyle 2010 JC 66, the court agrees with the submission, which was broadly put, that the headline sentence of 22 years was excessive. The court will allow the appeal, take as its starting point a punishment part of 19 years and discount that to one of 16 years.