ALEXANDER WATSON v. PROCURATOR FISCAL GLASGOW
| APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY |
| Lord Coulsfield Lord Philip Lord Caplan | Appeal No: 805/00 OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD COULSFIELD in BILL OF SUSPENSION by ALEXANDER WATSON Appellant; against PROCURATOR FISCAL, Glasgow Respondent: _______ |
Appellant: Party
Respondent: A. Smith, Q.C., A.D.; Crown Agent
7 November 2001
[1]The complainer was charged on a complaint including a charge of contravention of section 143(1) and (2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The complaint alleged that on 12 March 1999 he used a motor vehicle registered No. F285 EGE without insurance. The complaint went to trial at which the complainer was not legally represented. He was convicted of the charge of contravention of section 143(1) and (2) and fined £75. The sheriff also imposed eight penalty points, as a result of which the complainer was disqualified in terms of the totting up procedure.
[2]The Bill avers that the complainer had changed his car three times during the currency of an annual policy of insurance which was current at the time and which, the complainer alleges, covered his use of the vehicle in question. It also avers that the complainer had telephoned his insurers seeking a copy of the insurance certificate, that if he had been aware that only confirmation from the company would suffice as evidence of insurance he would have asked for the trial to be adjourned and, further, that the copy certificates actually arrived the day after the trial. The Bill further avers that it is clear that the complainer's use of the vehicle was covered at the material time.
[3]Several certificates of insurance have been produced, including a certificate which bears to relate to a vehicle registered No. G696 SSU and to be effective from 21 January 1999. A further certificate was produced which had effect in relation to a different vehicle from 17 March 1999 onwards. Both certificates contain a provision that the policy holder may also drive, with the owner's permission, a motor car not owned by the policy holder and not hired or leased to the policy holder under a hire purchase or annual leasing agreement. There is a note added to the certificate which points out that cover for driving cars other than the specified vehicle is limited to third party only. The complainer also produced a letter from the insurance company dated 13 March 2000 confirming that the complainer was covered to drive vehicle registration No. G696 SSU on 12 March 1999.
[4]It therefore appears that on 12 March 1999 the complainer was covered under the last-mentioned certificate not only for driving the vehicle registration No. G696 SSU but also for driving a vehicle not owned by or hired to him with the consent of the owner of such a vehicle. The issue which then arises is whether the vehicle registration No. F285 EGE which the complainer was driving on 12 March 1999 was one which he was covered to drive in terms of the certificate. The sheriff's report shows that at the trial one of the questions which was considered was whether the complainer was in fact the owner of the car F285 EGE which he was driving. The sheriff's report sets out the evidence which she heard, which consisted mainly of evidence from two police officers who stopped the car driven by the complainer. Essentially the position was that the complainer, according to the police, had admitted that the vehicle was his, he having purchased it the previous day at a car market in Airdrie. The complainer in evidence, according to the sheriff, admitted that he had bought the car the previous Sunday at, according to him, a sale in Glasgow. He explained, however, that he had bought the car as a birthday present for his girlfriend. The complainer explained to the sheriff that his girlfriend no longer had the car and that she was unable to give evidence at the trial because she was working. Another witness, a passenger who was with him in the car when it was stopped, was also, he explained, not available to give evidence. Having considered the evidence before her, the sheriff held that it was established that the car belonged to the complainer. It would follow that the car was not covered by the insurance certificates now produced to us.
[5]The Bill of Suspension contains no reference to the question of the ownership of the car. There has been no appeal against the sheriff's findings in fact and, in any event, it is in our view plain that, on the evidence narrated by her, the sheriff was entitled to make the findings which she did. When he appeared to present the Bill of Suspension, the complainer disputed the sheriff's findings but in the circumstances it is not open to him to do so.
[6]A further matter which was, however, raised was whether there was any unfairness to the complainer in the trial procedure. The complainer submitted that he had represented himself, and submitted that he had not understood what evidence was required to meet the charge. He further submitted, as we have noted, that witnesses who might have given evidence were not available. The sheriff's report, however, shows that the complainer was repeatedly offered an opportunity, at the trial, to ask for an adjournment either to obtain representation or to make evidence available. The sheriff says that she was satisfied that the complainer had been given ample opportunity to lead further evidence and that his decision not to do so was an informed one. The complainer accepted before us that he had been given an opportunity to ask for an adjournment but explained that he had not done so because he had already attended at court on a number of occasions and could not afford further attendances. In our view, in these circumstances there is no ground on which he can complain of the conduct of the trial
[7]In our opinion, therefore, in all the circumstances, no valid ground for challenging the conviction or sentence has been stated and the Bill must be refused.