RONALD SKEET AGAINST HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE

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APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY

[2015] HCJAC 66

HCA/2015-001146-XC

Lord Brodie

Lord Bracadale

Lord Turnbull

OPINION OF THE COURT

delivered by LORD BRODIE

in

SECTION 74 APPEAL

by

RONALD SKEET

Appellant;

against

HER MAJESTY’S ADVOCATE

Respondent:

Appellant:  Collins;  Neil F McPherson, Kilmarnock

Respondent:  Harper, AD;  Crown Agent

28 May 2015

[1]        This is an appeal in terms of section 74 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 at the instance of Ronald Skeet, who has been indicted for trial before the sheriff at Ayr on charges of contravention of various provisions of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.  The trial diet has been fixed for 22 June 2015. 

[2]        The appellant has objected to the admissibility of certain evidence allegedly recovered following a search of a vehicle, driven by the appellant, and stopped at a location in Ayr by police officers on 9 December 2014.  These police officers were purporting to act in terms of powers conferred by section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. 

[3]        The matter called before the sheriff for an evidential hearing on 24 March 2015, and continued to 27 March 2015.  In order to give rise to the power to stop and thereafter to search a vehicle, under section 23 of the 1971 Act, a constable must have reasonable grounds for believing that a person is in possession of a controlled drug.  After hearing evidence the sheriff held that the police had had such grounds at the relevant time and therefore that the search was lawful.  The appellant challenges that decision in this appeal. 

[4]        Before the sheriff the police spoke to three factors as having given rise to the suspicion which led them to stop the vehicle, these being:  (1) the location of the vehicle in an area known to be associated with dealing in drugs;  (2) the appearance of the appellant, which was said to be that associated with a drug user;  and (3) the actions of the passenger in looking down from the vehicle into the police vehicle.  The officers also spoke to the actions of the passenger after the stop and a disclosure made to them by the appellant.  However, in considering the reasonableness of the suspicion the sheriff, correctly in our opinion, looked at the information available to the officers prior to the stop of the vehicle.  The way he summarises his conclusion in his report is as follows:   

“I took the view that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect that the appellant or the passenger were in possession of controlled drugs.  It seems to me that the passenger staring into the vehicle that the police were in was of moment and was itself capable of being viewed as suspicious by the officer.  When one adds on the fact that the appellant looked like a drug user and was in an area well known for drug abuse then I am satisfied that the police have the lawful right to stop the vehicle.”

[5]        Mr Collins, who appeared on behalf of the appellant before us, argued that these matters were insufficient to give rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion.  He pointed to the fact that the area which the police had said was associated with drug use was wide and very vaguely defined;  he said that the appearance of the appellant might apply to many people and he argued that the action of the passenger was entirely neutral as looking at a police vehicle cannot be regarded as a suspicious act unless it is associated with something of the nature of evasive behaviour. 

[6]        We carefully considered the points made on behalf of the appellant by Mr Collins but we were not persuaded by them.  In particular, we took the view that the police were justified in attaching significance to the action of the passenger in taking an obvious interest in their vehicle, which could be identified as a police vehicle by its blue light, and to regard that taking of interest as a suspicious circumstance.  It is to be borne in mind, as the advocate depute submitted, that the decision on the reasonableness of the suspicion spoken to by the police officers was a question of fact and primarily it was a question of fact to be determined by the sheriff.  We simply cannot say that he was wrong to decide as he did. 

[7]        The appeal is accordingly refused and therefore as invited to by the advocate depute we remit the matter to be dealt with in the sheriff court. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

lau