T.P. FOR JUDICIAL REVIEWS OF DECISIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT v. , 20 February 2009, Lord Brodiexmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">

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OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF
SESSION [2009] CSOH |
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OPINION OF LORD BRODIE in the Petition of TP Pursuer; For Judicial Review of decisions of the Secretary of State for the Home Department Defenders: ннннннннннннннннн________________ |
Pursuers: Caskie;
Drummond Miller LLP
Defenders: Lindsay; Office of the Solicitor to the Advocate
General
Introduction
[1] The petitioner was born on
The petition
[2] In this petition for judicial review, the petitioner seeks declarator that her continued detention is unlawful, payment of damages and other orders, including liberation and interim liberation.
[3] Paragraph 2 (2)
of schedule 3 to the 1971 Act provides:
"Where notice has been given to a person in accordance with regulations under section 105 of the Nationality Immigration Asylum Act 2002 (notice of decision) of a decision to make a deportation order against him, and he is not detained in pursuance of the sentence or order of the court, he may be detained under the authority of the Secretary of State pending the making of the deportation order".
Parties before me were
agreed that the power of the respondent under paragraph 2(2) is impliedly
limited by reference to what have become known as the Hardial Singh principles.
This is a reference to a decision of Woolf J, as he was then, in R v Governor of
"(i) The Secretary of State must intend to deport the person and can only use the power to detain for that purpose;
(ii) The deportee may only be detained for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances;
(iii) If, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the Secretary of State will not be able to effect deportation within that reasonable period, he should not seek to exercise the power of detention;
(iv) The Secretary of State should act with reasonable diligence and expedition to effect removal".
[4] In this petition I would understand parties to be at issue as to whether the respondent may have further limited her power in terms of paragraph 2(2) by adopting a policy in respect of persons she intends to deport. This policy is contained in a document, "Enforcement Instructions & Guidance" at chapter 55. It was formally published as "Operational Enforcement Manual" at chapter 38. These are documents addressed to officials and instruct them in the exercise of the powers delegated to them by the respondent. Munby J, sitting in the Administrative Court, held that the respondent had so limited her powers when he determined that compliance with the relevant requirements of the Operational Enforcement Manual was a condition of the legality of detention in terms of paragraph 2(2), but he was reversed on that by the Court of Appeal: SK (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 1204. I would understand that decision to be currently under appeal to the House of Lords.
[5] The present petition foreshadows a
number of bases upon which it may be contended that the petitioner's continued
detention is unlawful. One is by
reference to the Hardial Singh principles. Another is by reference to the requirements
of the Enforcement Instructions & Guidelines. For that argument to succeed would require
the court to hold that SK (
Submissions of parties
[6] The petition came before me on the
motion roll on
[7] The argument before me was limited to the effect of the application of the Hardial Singh principles. Mr Caskie invited me to consider whether that argument provided the petitioner with a prima facie case and then, if I thought that it did, to approach the question as to whether interim liberation should be granted on the basis of the balance of convenience.
[8] In developing his argument, Mr Caskie
drew my attention to the history of events which appeared in statement 5 of the
petition. The petitioner and her
children had resided in the
[9] Mr Caskie submitted that the
petitioner's averments constituted a strong prima
facie case. He emphasised the length
of time during which the petitioner has been detained and the likely length of
time during which she would be detained before her statutory appeal was
determined unless she was granted liberation. He did not, however, make any
criticism of the timetabling of the statutory appeal. He did not, for example, suggest that this
involved a contravention of the petitioner's article 6 rights to a hearing
within a reasonable length of time. He
accepted that when I refused to liberate the petitioner the date for the
hearing of the petitioner's appeal would be accelerated and he was scrupulous
in acknowledging the co-operation between those instructing him and those
acting for the respondent and the court in fixing and, if need be, exchanging
diets in order to give priority to cases where a party was detained. However, assuming the petitioner was
successful before the Inner House the statutory proceedings were likely to be
prolonged in that Mr Caskie anticipated that there would be a need for the
Inner House to refer the case back to the Asylum and Immigration Ttribunal
in order to make further findings of fact in relation to the circumstances of
the petitioner and her family with a view to providing a proper basis for the
article 8 argument. Mr Caskie acknowledged
that the statutory appeal raised difficult issues. Nevertheless there was no immediate prospect
of the petitioner's removal from the
[10] Mr Lindsay began his submissions by
emphasising two matters of fact. First,
the first order in this petition had been granted in August 2008, and,
accordingly, the petitioner had delayed for some months in bringing an
application for interim liberation.
Second, largely repeating what had been said by Mr Caskie,
Mr Lindsay emphasised that the Keeper of the Rolls would arrange the
earliest possible diet for the statutory appeal in the event of the application
for interim liberation being refused.
Mr Lindsay then turned to consider the role of the court when
reviewing a decision of the Secretary of State to continue the detention of
someone in terms of paragraph 2(2) of schedule 3 to the
1971 Act. He referred to the
decision of Lord Prosser in Sokha v
Secretary of State for the Home Department 1992
[11] In a brief second speech, Mr Caskie emphasised that the purpose of this hearing was to determine not whether the initial detention of the petitioner had been unreasonable but whether it was now unreasonable. In his submission the reasonable time for detention had long expired. The petitioner should be granted interim liberation.
Discussion and decision
[12] Notwithstanding what might be taken from
the opinions in Sokha v Secretary of State for the Home Department
and Singh v Secretary of State for the Home Department and, what
Mr Lindsay informed me, was the practice of the Outer House when
reviewing the detention of persons in terms of paragraph 2 (2)?
powers at a time when applications for interim liberation of such persons came
more commonly before the court, it is conceded on behalf of the respondent
that, subsequent to the enactment of Human Rights Act 1998, the court
should exercise a primary jurisdiction, that is, it should come to and apply
its own view as to the legality of the detention on an application of the Hardial Singh principles. The court should not, as may formerly have
been the case, restrict itself to considering whether the decision to continue
detention was one falling within a proper exercise of the respondent's
discretion. As invited to, that is approach
which I adopt.
[13] Mr Caskie proposed that the
appropriate way for me to proceed was by first by considering whether the
petitioner's averments disclosed a prima
facie case and then, if they did, determining whether or not to grant
interim liberation by reference to the balance of convenience. I decline to follow this proposal. The rationale of an interim application is
that the circumstances are such that there is an urgent need for a remedy at a
time when the right upon which the remedy depends cannot finally be
determined. In such a case the court may
be prepared to come to a provisional view on the question of right and, if that
is favourable to the party seeking the remedy, grant it on an interim
basis. The familiar technique is to
consider whether there is a prima facie
case and, if so, to proceed to consider how an award of the remedy on an
interim basis would impact on the affected parties, with a view to determining
where the balance of convenience lies.
However, taking a provisional view is only necessary where it is not
possible or not practicable to take a final view. This is not such a case. I heard what I took be be a full argument by
both parties on the only point which is relied on: that the petitioner's continued detention was
not lawful when tested by reference to the Hardial
Singh principles. The facts were
uncontroversial. Neither party suggested
that my understanding would be materially supplemented by the leading of
evidence. I was therefore in as good a
position as I was ever likely to be to determine the question. I was persuaded by parties that, in the event
that I considered the detention unlawful, there may be practicalpracticable
advantages in describing the remedy granted as interim liberation as opposed to
liberation simpliciter, irrespective
of the apparent logic of the position.
Conditions might be attached to a grant of interim liberation. The interim character would make clear that
the court's order was without prejudice to any further lawful detention that
the respondent might authorise, in the event of refusal of the petitioner's
statutory appeal, for example. While I
see the force of these considerations and while I appreciate that any order for
liberation that I might grant will inevitably have an interim quality about it,
I consider it appropriate now to approach the question of the legality of the
petitioner's detention in exactly the same way as I would approach the question
on a final basis.
[14] Turning then to consider the petitioner's detention in the light of the history set out in the averments in the petition and the Hardial Singh principles, I have not been persuaded that the respondent's decision to continue the detention of the petitioner is unlawful.
[15] The respondent's power under paragraph 2
(2) is limited. It is purely ancillary
to the powers ? to decide to deport and to remove from
the
"The refusal of voluntary repatriation is important not only as evidence of a risk of absconding, but also because there is a big difference between administrative detention in circumstances where there is no immediate prospect of the detainee being able to return to his country of origin and detention in circumstances where he could return there at once. In the latter case the loss of liberty involved in the individual's continued detention is the product of his own making"
There are also the facts that the petitioner here has made no attempt to comply with immigration controls. She has been convicted of being concerned in the supply of a substantial quantity of Class A drugs. In all the circumstances I cannot conclude that her continuing detention is unlawful, and, accordingly, I shall refuse the application for interim liberation.