
|
EXTRA DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION |
|
Lord PhilipLord WheatleyLord Marnoch |
[2008] CSIH 8XA186/06 OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD MARNOCH in APPEAL From the Sheriffdom of Grampian,
Highland & Islands at in the cause MR. JAMES WILSON Pursuer and Appellant; against Defenders and Respondents: _______ |
Act: Lindsay, Beveridge & Kellas (Taggart Neil Mathers,
Alt: Hajducki, Q.C.; Morton Fraser (
[1] This is an
appeal against the decision of the sheriff in a Summary Application in which it
was sought to impugn the validity of a refusal by the defenders and respondents
to allow substitution of a vehicle in respect of a taxi licence held by the
pursuer and appellant in terms of para. 9(2) of Schedule 1 and section 10(5) of
the Civic Government (
[2] The sheriff
upheld the refusal and in our opinion correctly identified the dispute as being
truly focused on the validity or otherwise of the respondents' policy in
relation to the initial grant of taxi licences having regard to the need for
wheelchair access. That policy was to
require all persons applying for a licence after
[3] The question at
issue has perhaps been bedevilled by the respondents' reliance, in this context,
on section 10(2) of the 1982 Act which provides that:
"(2) A
licensing authority shall not grant or renew a taxi licence or private hire car
licence unless they are satisfied that the vehicle to which the licence is to
relate is suitable in type, size and design for use as a taxi or private hire
car, as the case may be, and is safe for that use, and that there is in force
in relation to the vehicle such a policy of insurance or such security as
complies with Part 6 of the Road Traffic Act 1972."
These same requirements, we might add, have to be met in relation
to substitute vehicles and the respondents' position was that they could
exercise an unfettered discretion in deciding what vehicles to approve. However, exclusive reliance on that
subsection does give rise to the argument strongly advanced by counsel for the
appellant, namely that its requirements cannot be applied piecemeal or
differentially as between identical vehicles but, on the contrary, must be
applied consistently to all taxis within the area covered by the local
authority. We see the force of that argument
and it may well be that reliance might better have been placed on, for
instance, para. 5 of Schedule 1 to the Act which does allow conditions to be
attached to individual licences.
[4] All that
said, we cannot be other than wholly sympathetic to a policy which in the end,
we accept, envisages that the whole taxi fleet in the Aberdeen area will be
wheelchair accessible as, indeed, has already been achieved in other local
authority areas within Scotland. If that
policy has to be justified within the strict parameters of section 10(2) of the
Act, then we think that the sting of the argument advanced by counsel for the
appellant is largely drawn if one views the policy as being, in effect, a
decision by the Council that as from 19 August 1994 all taxis should ideally be
wheelchair accessible with a temporary relaxation being granted, for purely
commercial reasons, in favour of pre-1994 operators. Mr. Lindsay submitted strenuously that it was
Wednesbury unreasonable to regard 13
years (or even 11 years up to the date of refusal of the appellant's
application) as being, in any proper sense, a transitional period. But, in our opinion, that consideration is
offset by the rationale set out by the Licensing Committee at para. 9(i) of
their Statement of Reasons which is in the following terms:
"(i) ...
the Committee considered that they have been attempting to bring
about a change in the type of taxi
vehicles in the
We might add that there appears to be no shortage of new
applicants who are prepared to enter the trade in the knowledge of the
respondents' policy.
[5] For all the
above reasons we are satisfied that this appeal must be refused.