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APPEAL
COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY |
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Lord Justice General
Lord Nimmo Smith
Lord MacLean
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[2007] HCJAC 74
Appeal No: XC615/06
OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD NIMMO SMITH in NOTE OF APPEAL in terms of sections 108 and 110 of the Criminal
Procedure ( by THE LORD ADVOCATE Appellant; against JOSEPH HARRISON Respondent: _______ |
Act: McConnachie, Q.C.,
A.D.; Crown Agent
Alt: Richards, Q.C., Gianni;
[1] This is a
Crown appeal against the sentence passed on the respondent in the High Court at
"(2) on
22 February 2005 at Castle Terrace, Aberdeen, Denside of Catterline or
elsewhere, whilst within motor car registered number P595 FSR, you did assault
Susan Mary Third ... and did seize her by the neck, place your hands around her
neck and compress same, place a ligature and compact disc carrier case or
similar item against her neck and compress same, and did kill her".
The Crown accepted the respondent's plea of guilty to this
charge under substitution of the word "kill" for the word "murder" in the last
line, and his pleas of not guilty to three other charges in the indictment. After sundry procedure to obtain the reports
referred to below, on
[2] The
respondent's plea was accepted by the Crown on the basis that he killed the
deceased at a time when he was suffering from diminished responsibility. As to the history of the respondent, the
history of the case and a narrative of the facts, the Advocate depute, when
moving for sentence, read out the following account, which is set out in full
in the sentencing judge's report to us and which we think appropriate to repeat
here in full:
"History
of the accused
The
accused Joseph Harrison is 28 years old.
His date of birth is
The
accused has previous convictions as libelled in the schedule tendered.
History of the case
The
accused appeared on petition at
On
Narrative of the facts
At
about
It read,
'So sorry, I wished we lived far away
from here. Please come to C me in jail
as I love you and baby. Please 4give me
and don't 4get me. Yours 4ever, Joe.'
Ms
Stevenson was worried and contacted the accused's sister,
Patricia Harrison. Ms Stevenson
continually attempted to contact the accused.
She left 50 text messages on his mobile phone between that moment and
At
about
Inside,
the accused told Ms Bonner that he wanted to die. The accused was looking at himself in the
mirror and talking to himself. There
were tears coming down his face. Ms
Bonner asked the accused if he had taken any drugs. The accused replied that he had not.
At
one point Ms Bonner gave the accused a hug to console him. He kissed her on the lips and put his hand on
her stomach. He pushed her gently
backwards onto the bed. Ms Bonner formed
the impression that the accused wanted to have sex with her, but she said to him
that that could not happen. The accused
again became emotional and started to cry.
The accused told Ms Bonner that he had come to say goodbye before
he killed himself. Ms Bonner was
sufficiently concerned for the accused that she called for an ambulance. The accused was unhappy that Ms Bonner had
called an ambulance. Ms Bonner locked
the accused inside her house so that he could not escape medical
attention. The accused became
increasingly agitated and said that he wanted to go away and kill himself.
Ambulance
staff arrived about 15 to 20 minutes later.
The accused persuaded them that there was nothing wrong with him. He said that he had been feigning with Ms
Bonner in order to get her to let him into her house. The accused told the paramedics that he had
not taken alcohol nor drugs. The
paramedics had no reason to disbelieve him.
The accused declined the paramedics' offer of further medical
assistance. Police constables
arrived. They were informed by the
paramedics that the accused appeared fit and well and that they had no concerns
for his wellbeing. The accused provided
full details to the PCs. He told them
that he lived in Brechin with his pregnant girlfriend. He told them that he was having problems with
his former partner on the issue of access to his children. The accused was upset when talking about this
and he said that he was taking legal advice on the matter. The accused told the PCs he was going to
return home to Brechin. He said that he
owned a red Nissan Almera motor car. He
was allowed to leave.
After
leaving, the accused drove to
The
accused was gesticulating to Ms Blackburn and motioning that she was to
reverse. The accused got out of his car
and came up to Ms Blackburn's driver door window. Ms Blackburn rolled her window
down. The accused was shouting, 'I can't
fucking hear you.' He was also shouting,
repeatedly, 'Reverse the fucking car.'
Ms Blackburn describes the accused as being like, '... a man possessed, if
he wasn't on drugs he should have been on medication'. She said that the accused was,
'... almost nose to nose with me. He never blinked at any stage and his pupils
were really big. I don't recall there
being any smell of alcohol on his breath.
Although I was trying to speak, the man was just away with the fairies.'
As
Ms Blackburn reversed up the street, the accused had his car bumper against
hers as if to force her to reverse. Ms
Blackburn was having difficulty in completing such a difficult manoeuvre. She stopped and telephoned her husband,
pointing to the accused's registration plate in an attempt to suggest that she
was telephoning the police. The accused
then reversed his car, accordingly to Ms Blackburn, '... like a bat out of hell'. The accused then drove off along Pocra Quay
towards the Harbour. Ms Blackburn
had noted the accused's registration number.
Ms Blackburn was very frightened and upset as a result of this
incident. The accused denied any
knowledge of the incident.
At
about
At
about
At
some time between
At
about
The
police officers became aware of a car coming towards them at speed as they were
placing cones across the southbound carriageway of the A90. The constables signalled to the driver to
slow down with the intention of diverting the car onto the southbound A92. The car was estimated to be travelling at
about 70 miles per hour. The car failed
to stop and continued down the A90. The
car was a red Nissan Almera and the driver appeared to be alone in the
car. The driver was the accused and the
red Nissan Almera was his car.
At
about
At
about
Mr Ogilvie
found the accused at a bus shelter at
During
the journey Mr Ogilvie continued his conversation with the accused. The accused appeared to be rambling. He told Mr Ogilvie that there had been a
road block outside
Police
officers came to the accused's home. Ms
Stevenson told them what the accused had said to her. The accused agreed voluntarily to be taken to
Stonehaven police station for interview.
The accused was cautioned en route in the police car. The accused was medically examined and deemed
fit to be interviewed.
At
The
accused also said
'I went to my mum's, that's in
Brechin. My girlfriend was working. Mum was going on about the two kids that I
don't see. When she speaks about them it
gets me wound up, trying to go through the courts to get access, em so I left
there and wisnae in a very good frame of mind after that. I kept trying to tell her I would get it
sorted. She kept going on about it. I went and got some drink after that. I went to Inverbervie; I went to see a friend
who I hadn't seen for a long time. She
has a history sort of mental, she called the paramedics and two police officers
came. I said to them I would be all
right. Two police officers said they
would follow me to Brechin, make sure I got there. Got in the car, that got me thinking,
girlfriend would be finished work and be upset and everything. Just took off in the car and ended up in
The
accused was asked what then happened. He
replied, 'I got in the car with the money, she just took it and I strangled
her.' The accused was asked what he
strangled her with. He replied,
'Hands and then I don't remember all
the events, came out of
The
accused was asked if he had strangled the deceased in the car or outside. He replied, 'In the car.' He went on to say that he had used his hands and
that the deceased had initially struggled with him. He said that he had put the deceased's body
in the boot. When asked, the accused
denied having sexual contact with the deceased.
It was put to the accused that there appeared to be marks on the deceased's
neck indicative of some sort of implement or ligature, the accused replied,
'The box. The CD box. I used the CD box, the face of the CD box.'
The
accused was formally cautioned and arrested on suspicion of murder.
Pathology
Post Mortem
examination of the deceased's body was carried out by Doctors Saddler and
Booth. They concluded that the deceased
died as a result of strangulation. There
were classic signs of strangulation, such as petechiae evident over the deceased's eyelids, inside the lips and
behind the ears. The most significant
injuries were to the front of the deceased's neck from the level of the chin
above to the collar bones below. There
was diffuse pink bruising to the upper front of the deceased's neck. Within this area there were several
overlapping horizontally aligned ligature marks, typically up to
110 millimetres in length and 2 to 3 millimetres in width.
On
the right side of the deceased's upper neck there were three superficial
discontinuous linear scratch type abrasions. There were two larger abrasions on the under
surface of the deceased's chin at the mid line and to the left side. There was extensive bruising over the left
collarbone. Beneath the skin at the
front of the deceased's neck there was extensive haemorrhage within the muscles
and particularly severe bruising along the under surface of the lower jaw. There was extensive bruising inside both lips
and laceration of the lower lip most likely where it had been forcibly pressed
against the deceased's front teeth.
The
pathologists' opinion was the death occurred as a result of strangulation most
likely caused by throttling with the hands and the application of some form of
ligature across the front of the deceased's neck. When asked specifically whether the accused's
CD carrier, which they were shown, could have caused those injuries, both
pathologists thought that the horizontally aligned marks on the deceased's neck
were more likely to have been caused by the application of a ligature such as a
thin cord.
There
were dried abrasions to both of the deceased's knees, the right hip bone and
upper back area. There was no associated
underlying bruising and these injuries were thought to have occurred after the
deceased had died. These injuries were
thought to be consistent with the deceased's body having been removed from the
accused's car boot and movement thereafter.
There
was no evidence of injury to the deceased's vulva or vagina to suggest forcible
penetration. However, there was a small
tear to the deceased's anal margin. The
pathologists are of the view that this injury occurred after death, due to the
absence of associated bruising.
They
both expressed a conclusion, with 70% certainty, which points towards the
accused having had sexual contact with the deceased post mortem. This falls to
be considered along with the forensic evidence to the effect that the body of
the deceased had been placed on the bonnet of the accused's car at the locus where it was found.
Forensic Analysis
Forensic scientists' examination,
based upon DNA analysis, concluded that there had been some form of sexual
contact between the accused and the deceased.
The deceased's DNA type was detected on the left front of the accused's
boxer shorts.
Examination
of the accused's car was carried out.
The forensic scientists concluded, inter
alia, that the muddy, semi-clothed body of the deceased had been placed
over the bonnet of the accused's car, with the head lying towards the
windscreen washer jets. The deceased's
body may have then slid from that position to the ground, explaining the
position in which the deceased's body was found."
[3] The
respondent had been the subject of extensive psychiatric investigation by the
time that the sentencing judge came to pass sentence on him. After he had been taken into custody, he
became a patient in the
[4] Also on
[5] With regard
to the circumstances of the offence, counsel said that the respondent was
unable to give a complete account of the events of 26 and
[6] The case
called before the sentencing judge again on
[7] The case
called before him once more on
[8] On
[9] On
[10] When passing
sentence, the sentencing judge made the following remarks, which we think
appropriate to reproduce in full:
"Joseph Harrison, you pled guilty to
the culpable homicide of Susan Third.
That
plea was offered and accepted on the basis of diminished responsibility. The evidence which I heard when the case
first came before me last October in
Following
a period of examination and treatment in the
In
that situation I am able now to pass sentence in the normal way, but I must
make it plain that I am passing sentence today for the crime to which you pled
guilty and on the basis of diminished responsibility, as was accepted by the
Crown last October.
The
crime of culpable homicide is, of course, always a very serious matter, because
someone has been killed. The degree of
culpability, however, can vary enormously from one case to another, depending
on all the circumstances.
Nothing
that I can do, of course, can bring Susan Third back to life. Her death is a tragedy for all concerned,
particularly her family and friends. And
their sense of loss is a continuing one, which I fully recognise. The sentence that I pass must not be seen as
in any way putting some kind of value on her life. What I have to do is to pass a sentence which
is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case, having regard of
course to what happened but also to your situation at the time. The sentence must also be consistent with
sentences in other cases of this kind which have been approved by the Court of
Appeal.
In
this case I have taken full account of the circumstances in which this offence
occurred insofar as they are known.
Insofar as I was also given background information, I take account of it
for the purpose of filling in the background and giving me a fuller picture of
this very unusual case. However, insofar
as there was any suggestion that you might have committed other criminal
conduct at or about this time, that can form no part of the matter for which I
am passing sentence. I can only pass
sentence for the offence to which you pled guilty.
You
have four previous convictions but, although there was one for assault on indictment,
they are relatively minor compared with this offence and none of them resulted
in a custodial sentence.
I
have, of course, carefully considered the medical evidence and reports which
have been provided and I have carefully considered the social enquiry
report. I have also taken into account
all that Mrs Richards has said on your behalf both today and on the previous
occasions when the case called before me.
I also take into account the fact that you accepted responsibility for
what you did and pled guilty to this offence.
That saved the public expense of a trial and further trauma for the
family and friends of the deceased. For
that the law provides that you are entitled to a discount.
Having
regard to what is said in the social enquiry report, it seems to me that an
extended sentence would be appropriate.
That is to protect the public from any risk that you may present but it
is also meant to be of benefit to you when you are eventually released from custody.
Having
regard to all the circumstances in this difficult and anxious case I sentence
you to an extended sentence of nine years imprisonment. The custodial part of that sentence will be
six years and the extension part three years.
If
you had not pled guilty, the custodial part would have been eight years,
which would have made a total of eleven years.
The
sentence will take effect from
[11] In the Note of
Appeal, after a narrative of the history of the case and a brief account of the
circumstances of the offence, the Crown state:
"5. The only explanation before the court
for the offence was [the respondent's] mental state at the time of the
offence. No full risk assessment was
obtained, but the social enquiry report assessed him as being at medium risk of
re-offending heightened by an absence of any understanding on his part of why
he committed the crime. His risk of
causing harm to others if he re-offended was assessed as high, but the
respondent had difficulty in accepting this.
He had previously been convicted of an offence involving domestic
violence, and continued to show little insight into the causes of his violent
behaviour.
6. The
psychiatric report of
give any informed opinion as to the
risk of further serious offending'. It
envisages the possibility, albeit unlikely, that the respondent's mental state
may deteriorate if he returns to prison.
7. In
all the circumstances the sentence imposed does not reflect the
gravity of the offence and does not
provide sufficient protection for members of the public."
In his report to this court, the sentencing judge comments on
these grounds of appeal. He states that
this was a case of culpable homicide on the basis of diminished responsibility,
and that it seemed to him to be necessary when considering the gravity of the
offence to have regard to the extent to which the respondent's responsibility
was diminished. Dr. Thomson had expressed
the opinion that there was evidence that the respondent was suffering from a
major process mental illness, possibly schizophrenia, and that at the time of
the offence he had an abnormality of mind which substantially impaired his
ability to determine and control his actions.
It was on this basis that she expressed the view that the respondent's
responsibility for the offence was diminished.
This opinion was confirmed in her oral evidence, in which she further
explained that the respondent was psychotic at the time of the offence. In her report dated
"In relation to protection for
members of the public, it was, of course, with that in mind that I imposed an
extended sentence with an extension period of three years. It should also be noted that if, as stated by
Dr Darjee towards the end of his report of 26 June 2006, the respondent's
mental state deteriorates in prison (which would no doubt give rise to concern
as to the risk he might present to the public) then, if the situation warranted
it, he could be returned to the State Hospital.
In that situation, it seems to me that the protection of the public has
been appropriately taken into account."
[12] When the
appeal first came before us on
[13] Dr. Thomson
had access to all previous reports on and records relating to the
respondent. When he was sentenced, there
was no recommendation for a psychiatric disposal before the court, so the
respondent was sent to prison. After an
initial period of a few months in HMP, Edinburgh, he was transferred on
"Opinion
1. Mr
Harrison described and displayed some psycho-pathological
symptoms and signs during his initial
stay within the
2. Given
Mr
medication was discontinued. At the time of interview he had been free of
any antipsychotic medication for over 14 months and had not become overtly
psychotic. He does suffer from anxiety
but this is improving and he feels more settled and safe within HMP Peterhead. 80% of people with schizophrenia will relapse
within a 2 year period if untreated. It
is unlikely that Mr Harrison has schizophrenia.
At the present time there is no evidence that Mr Harrison has
schizophrenia. At the present time there
is no evidence to suggest that Mr Harrison suffers from a major mental illness.
3. Mr
Harrison has a significant history of drug abuse, in particular of
Amphetamine and Ecstasy. He denied using either since the summer of
2004 but admits to using Cannabis occasionally.
His sister believed that he had used Cannabis once on the day prior to
the index offence. Mr Harrison thought
that this was not the case and that he had used it around Christmas 2004. Cannabis can lead to increased persecutory
ideation. Even if he had used Cannabis
near to the index offence, this level of drug use is unlikely to have caused a
full blown drug induced psychosis. Mr
Harrison scored in the low level of difficulties on the drug abuse screen test
(DAST-20) when considering difficulties with drug abuse for the 12 months prior
to his detention according to self report.
4. Mr
Harrison has a conviction for drink driving.
Prior to the index
offence he was drinking up to one
bottle of Buckfast wine once per week on a Saturday night. This was confirmed by his partner. He describes silly behaviour at times
following the consumption of alcohol. Mr
Harrison scored in the low level of dependence on alcohol for the 12 months
prior to his detention according to self report on the alcohol dependence scale
(ADF).
5. It
is the case that Mr Harrison has clear difficulties in coping with
stress, particularly following the
birth of children. There is a clear
pattern of him driving away at times of stress and being unable to remember
what happened. This has been described
on four occasions.
i) In
2000 after the birth of Mr Harrison's son, [D].
At this
time he found himself on the M6 in
ii) In
2003 he disappeared for 30 hours after the birth of [T].
He denies any use of alcohol or drugs
on this occasion. His substance misuse
around this time is reported as reduced to weekend use only.
iii) One
week prior to his index offence he drove to
denies any recollection of this. His girlfriend reports that he was agitated
and shaking prior to driving away. She
was sufficiently concerned that she made an appointment for Mr Harrison with
his general practitioner following this event.
The use of substances is denied on this occasion.
iv) On
the night of the index offence he drove to
denies any recollection of the drive
from Inverbervie to
He denies any use of drugs on this
day although his sister reports that he may have taken Cannabis on the previous
day.
Any use of substances is likely to
contribute to impulsive actions and loss of memory but this is denied on two of
the above occasions. It may be that at
times of stress Mr Harrison has a disturbance or alteration in the normally
integrative functions of identity, memory or consciousness, known as a
dissociative state. In a dissociative
fugue:
i. there
must be no evidence of a physical disorder that can explain the characteristic
symptoms of this disorder (although physical disorders may be present that give
rise to other symptoms).
ii. there
are convincing associations in time between the onset of symptoms of the disorder
and stressful events, problems and needs.
iii. the
individual undertakes an unexpected yet organised journey away from home from
the ordinary places of work and social activities, during which self care is
largely maintained.
iv. there
is amnesia, either partial or complete, for the journey. This amnesia is too extensive and persistent
to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness (although its depth and extent may
vary from one assessment to the next) or by intentional simulation. (World Health Organisation, International
Classification of Diseases - 10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural
Disorders).
Mr Harrison has a number of
pre-disposing factors towards the development of psychiatric symptoms including
a family history of depression, anxiety, psychotic symptoms and alcohol
misuse. In addition there are clear
precipitating factors to the development of his anxiety including parental
separation, parental ill health, working on the family farm due to his father's
illness, a disruptive relationship and the birth of children. Perpetuating factors at the time of the index
offence included his girlfriend's pregnancy and separation from his two
children.
6. There
is no evidence that Mr Harrison has any form of paraphilia.
Detailed consideration was given
during Mr Harrison's assessment within the
7. I
have included within my report a structured clinical risk assessment.
This highlights the historical risk
facts of previous violence, problematic relationship, substance use problems
and major mental illness. The clinical
items are relevant to the period around his interview with me in February 2007
and were largely negative with the exception of possible impulsivity. Comments on risk items are difficult because
these are limited within the prison setting but would be likely to increase and
therefore need reassessed at the time of any release. Mr Harrison would clearly require a package
of care that addressed the issues of substance misuse, observed him for the
development of any symptoms or signs of major mental illness, provided personal
support, and which moderated the effects of any stressors such as new
relationships, pregnancy or births of children or an excessive workload.
8. You
asked me to address whether a psychological opinion is necessary.
I have provided a detailed risk
assessment. You may wish to have a
further assessment of his personality carried out. He had a psychological assessment within the
With this report before the court, neither party invited us
to order any further report. The
discussion therefore centred on Dr. Thomson's report and the expressions of
opinion contained therein, which we have seen fit to quote in full above.
[14] The Advocate
depute submitted that, having regard to the factors Dr. Thomson identified as
being clearly present, the appropriate conclusion was that the risk presented
by the respondent was high, particularly in relationship situations, and where
drug misuse and alcohol were involved.
The overall period selected by the sentencing judge was unduly lenient. The crime involved the strangulation,
manually and by ligature, of a complete stranger, in circumstances where,
despite extensive psychiatric assessment and a number of interviews, the
reasons for the offence remained completely unexplained. This went both to the gravity of the offence
and the protection of the public. Having
regard to the nature of the evidence, the discount allowed by the sentencing
judge to reflect the plea of guilty was excessive. In any event, the sentencing judge had
misdirected himself in his approach to the protection of the public. If he had decided that the respondent
required to be either in custody or under supervision for a total period of 11
years, irrespective of any discount which it was appropriate to allow in the
period of custody to take account of the respondent's plea of guilty, the total
length of the sentence ought to have remained at 11 years.
[15] In response to
these submissions, senior counsel for the respondent referred in the first
place to the observations made in McGowan
v HM Advocate 2005 SCCR 497,
where at paragraphs [15] to [17] the court observed inter alia: (1) that the imposition of an extended term should not
affect the length of the custodial term;
(2) that for the purposes of discounting in respect of a plea of guilty
no allowance should be made in respect of an extension period or any element of
a custodial term which is for the protection of the public; and (3) that a risk assessment represents
advice to the court for which the author requires expertise in the techniques
devised for the purpose, that it is not appropriate for the court to reject the
assessment in favour of some technical exercise of its own, or to modify the
terms in which that assessment is expressed, though it is a matter for the
court to determine what weight to attach to it, and ultimately it is for the
court to decide, on the basis of the whole material before it, whether the
period for which the offender would, apart from section 110A of the 1995 Act,
be subject to a licence would not be adequate for the purpose of protecting the
public from serious harm and, if not so adequate, what length of extension
period is, subject to the applicable maximum, appropriate. Counsel submitted that it was inappropriate
for the advocate depute to invite the court to conclude from Dr. Thomson's
report that the respondent represented a high risk. All the risk factors which it was relevant to
take into account were before the sentencing judge. The mere fact that the respondent could not
explain satisfactorily why he committed the offence might be related to the
reason why he committed it in the first place, that is to say that he was
mentally unwell. The sentencing judge's
report was highly comprehensive, and it was clear that he had taken all
relevant factors into account. The base
figure selected by him before discount was consistent with that in R B v HM Advocate 2004 SCCR 443.
If there were cogent reasons for allowing a discount, there required to
be careful consideration before an appellate court would interfere.
[16] We can well
understand why the sentencing judge described this as a difficult and anxious
case. The killing of the deceased, a
vulnerable young woman, was done in a manner, and in circumstances, which would
appropriately be taken into account in determining that part of the sentence which
adequately reflected the need for punishment of the respondent. What required to be weighed against that,
however, was the fact that his plea of not guilty of murder but guilty of
culpable homicide was appropriately accepted by the Crown because he was indisputably
suffering from significantly diminished responsibility at the time of the
offence. Punishment requires to take
account not only of the gravity of the acts of the offender, but also of the
extent to which he was criminally responsible when he committed them. The sentencing judge clearly took account of
all material before him which was relevant to the exercise which he required to
undertake, of balancing these competing considerations. While different sentencers might, in an
anxious case such as this, reach different conclusions as to the appropriate
disposal, we are satisfied that the period of eight years selected by the
sentencing judge as his starting point for the custodial part of the sentence, as
punishment of the respondent, lay within the range available to him in the
exercise of his discretion, and we can see no reason to fault it. The Crown's approach to this appeal appears
to us to fail to recognise the necessary consequences of the Crown's own
earlier acceptance of a plea of guilty of culpable homicide on the basis of the
respondent's significantly diminished responsibility.
[17] Although the
Note of Appeal is not specifically directed to the discount from the custodial
part of the sentence which the sentencing judge allowed to reflect the
respondent's plea of guilty, we think it appropriate to make a brief comment
about it. The plea of guilty was
tendered and accepted at a continued preliminary hearing, after extensive
psychiatric investigation of the respondent's mental state at the time of the
offence and subsequently. It reflected
his contrition, and spared all concerned the ordeal of a distressing
trial. It was of utilitarian value, in
saving the resources and avoiding the inconvenience associated with a
trial. With these considerations in
mind, we can see no basis for criticising the discount of 25% allowed by the
sentencing judge, which appears to us to have been entirely appropriate in the
circumstances.
[18] There remains
for consideration the question of the protection of the public from serious
harm from the respondent. The sentencing
judge gave careful consideration to this, and determined on an extended
sentence under section 210A of the 1995 Act, the extension period selected by
him being one of three years. Two points
require to be made at this stage. The
first is that it was open to the sentencing judge to impose a discretionary life
sentence. There are cases where this is the
appropriate disposal for the protection of the public, even now when extended
sentences are available: see Kelly v HM Advocate 2000 SCCR 815. But it was not suggested to us that this is
such a case, or that the sentencing judge misdirected himself in deciding to
impose a determinate extended sentence. The
only question is as to its overall length.
The second point is that when the respondent is released on licence, the
period of licence will precede the extension period, and during the aggregate
of these periods the respondent will be subject to such degree of supervision
as may be thought necessary in light of his progress in custody and after his
release. If he were released on licence,
as he would be entitled to be, after serving four years of the six-year
custodial part, he would be subject to this degree of supervision for a total of
five years. There can be no doubt that
the sentencing judge had this in mind in determining upon the extension
period. Following the guidance in McGowan v HM Advocate, he had to proceed on the basis of the professional
advice available to him, as indeed he was requested to do by the parties. Human behaviour, particularly of such an
extreme kind as occurred here, is notoriously difficult to predict. But there are nevertheless predictive tools
available to experts such as those whose reports and evidence were available to
the sentencing judge, and also to this Court, supplemented in our case by the
further report from Dr Thomson which we requested. We are not persuaded by consideration of
these that the respondent represents, so far as can be predicted, such a high
degree of risk to the public that the sentencing judge ought to have selected a
longer extension period. On the
contrary, the period selected by him appears to us to strike the appropriate
balance, and we can see no reason to interfere with the exercise of his
discretion.
[19] On the whole
matter, we are satisfied that the sentence imposed on the respondent cannot be
described as unduly lenient, and for the reasons given in this Opinion this
Crown appeal is refused.