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APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY |
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Lord Justice ClerkLord Osborne Lord Johnston |
[2006] HCJAC 30Appeal Nos: XC463/03; XC462/03OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by THE LORD
JUSTICE CLERK in THE REFERRALS by THE
SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION in the cases of STEVEN ALEXANDER ROBERT
JOHNSTON First appellant; and BILLY ALLISON Second appellant; against HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE Respondent: _______ |
For the second appellant; Burns
QC, Shead;
For the Crown: Murphy QC AD,
Miss Reville; Crown Agent
[1] The
appellants were tried at Edinburgh High Court in March 1996 on the following
charge:
Green, Dunfermline you Billy Allison and Steven Alexander Robert Johnston did assault Andrew Forsyth, residing there, punch and kick him repeatedly on the head and body, strike him repeatedly on the head and body with pieces of wood or similar objects, stab him on the body with a pair of scissors, compress his throat with your hands and did murder him."
In the course of the trial, and
before defence evidence was led, the advocate depute amended the charge by
deleting "between 3 and
[2] The police
enquiry in this case was carried out by officers of Fife Constabulary. Within about three days after the finding of
Andrew Forsyth's body, D Insp Richard Munro became the senior investigating
officer in charge of the enquiry. He and
DS John Nessel were the reporting officers.
In 2004 Mr Munro, by then D Supt, resigned from the force in advance of
disciplinary proceedings unconnected with this case. It appears that DS Nessel is no longer
serving with Fife Constabulary. His
present whereabouts were not established at the hearing of evidence before
us. The enquiry was directed from an
incident room of which the officer in charge was D Insp Derek McEwan. He too has resigned from the force and now
lives in
[3] The
Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (the Commission) has referred the
cases of both appellants. It considers
that, by reason of the suppression of certain evidence by the police before the
trial and in the light of new evidence obtained since then, there may have been
a miscarriage of justice (cf Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (the 1995
Act), s 194C). The appellants have taken
the opportunity to appeal in these proceedings (ibid, s 194B(1);
II The background
[4] The
deceased lived near
III The trial
[5] The
Crown case was that the appellants murdered the deceased on Friday 3
November. It is common ground that
several witnesses saw the deceased alive in the course of that day. The defence case was that the appellants
assaulted the deceased that day in a fight in which he suffered only a nose
bleed and that he was alive and well as late as 7 November, and perhaps even in
the early evening of 9 November.
The eye-witness evidence
Witnesses for the Crown
[6] There
was no eye witness to the murder; but several witnesses implicated the
appellants directly. Thomas McMullan
said that he met the appellants in the evening of Friday 3 November. Both had blood on the legs of their jeans
below the knees. Allison had blood on
his white trainers. The witness went with
[7] James
Allan said that on Saturday 4 November while in the company of Allison, in a
room occupied by George McCrorie, he had seen clothing which he recognised as
Allison's. It included bloodstained
denims with what seemed to be a lot of blood in the thigh area. Allison asked McCrorie to get rid of the
clothing. Allison told this witness that
he did not know with whom he had been fighting.
Later that day, Allison asked the witness Gordon Shepherd (infra) to get his glasses from the
deceased's flat. When Shepherd came back
he said that he had seen the deceased lying in his flat and thought that he was
dead. Allison did not react to
this. Later,
[8] Samuel
Edgar, a barman, said that on Friday 3 November
[9] Gordon
Shepherd said that on Saturday 4 November Allison asked him to go to the
deceased's flat and get his glasses back.
When he looked through the window, he saw someone lying asleep on the
floor and, from his red hair, he assumed that it was the deceased. He thought that he was asleep through drink
or drugs. Later he thought that he might
be dead. This witness conceded that at
the time of these events he was in the middle of a "bender" and that he could
not recall the precise day on which these events occurred.
[10] Richard Anderson said that on Saturday 4 November
[11] James McDade said that on Saturday 4 November
[12] George McCrorie said that on the morning of Saturday 4 November
Allison gave him a pair of jeans, a shirt and a jacket. Allison asked him to get rid of them. He noticed one or two spots of blood on one leg
of the jeans. Allison's right hand was
bruised around the knuckles. He was not
wearing his glasses. This witness
disposed of the clothes at a tip.
[13] PC John Mathieson's evidence supported the defence case. He said that on Tuesday 7 November, at about
Witnesses for the defence
[14] Allison
said that he had had a fight with the deceased in his flat on Friday 3 November
in which he burst the deceased's nose and caused it to bleed. The fight had lasted for two minutes at
most. He had punched him three or four
times on the face before
[15]
[16] Eileen Thow said that she spoke briefly with the deceased at
the Rendezvous Bar on the evening of Sunday 5 November.
[17] Mary Brockie said that in the morning of Monday 6 November she
saw the deceased coming out of his flat in the company of a girl. She walked behind them into town.
[18] Janet Thow, Eileen Thow's mother, said that she was more than
50% sure that in the afternoon of Monday 6 November she saw the deceased from
the window of her flat.
[19] James Drummond said that some time after
[20] Alan Henderson said that he saw the deceased walking in
[21] In Allison's case, the eye-witness evidence was supplemented by
real evidence. His clothing was
recovered from the tip. Blood found on
the shirt and jacket did not belong to either of the appellants. It was highly probable that it was the blood
of the deceased. The lenses of Allison's
glasses were found in the deceased's flat.
Footprints were found on a paper in the livingroom. They corresponded with Allison's trainers in
terms of size, pattern and chance damage.
[22] Professor Pounder and Dr Diana Cox carried out a post mortem
examination on behalf of the Crown on the morning of Friday, 10 November. Professor Anthony Busuttil of the Department
of Forensic Medicine of the
[23] Professor Pounder and Professor Busuttil agreed that death was
caused by blunt force head and neck trauma; but they differed as to the time of
death. That question was critical
because, as a result of the amendment to which we have referred, the advocate depute
perilled the Crown case on proof that the murder was committed on 3 November
and on no other date.
[24] The post mortem report of Professor Pounder and Dr Cox did not
refer to time of death. At the trial,
Professor Pounder estimated that death occurred between three days and a week
before the body was discovered. His
preference was for a time of death in the upper end of that range. He said that the time of death could have
been up to two weeks before his post mortem.
He preferred a time of death a week or so before the post mortem, rather
than three days; but he could not
discount the possibility that the death had occurred on 5 November. In cross-examination, he was asked if it were
possible that the deceased could have been seen alive less than three days
before the post-mortem. He replied that
the chance of that was so remote that he would not consider it a serious
possibility. Professor Pounder's
estimate therefore supported the Crown case.
[25] From his post mortem examination, Professor Busuttil could not
assess when death had occurred. He
accepted that Professor Pounder had the advantage of him in that respect. From information provided by witnesses who
had seen the body while it was at the locus and immediately afterwards, and
from a perusal of Professor Pounder's notes, he considered that the death had
occurred at least 24 hours before Professor Pounder's post mortem, but probably
more than that. He considered that the
body had certainly been dead for 36 hours before it was found and could have
been dead for up to 48 hours. In his
opinion, the deceased had been dead for about 2 days before his body was found,
but certainly not for three or four. He
was emphatic that the body had not been lying there for seven days. His
estimate of the time of death was therefore incompatible with the Crown case.
The trial judge's directions
[26] There was plainly sufficient evidence to entitle the jury to convict both appellants. The trial judge directed the jury that the Crown case was that the appellants committed the murder on 3 November; that the evidence on which the Crown relied was tied to that date, and that, in consequence, the date of death was one of the essential facts. If the Crown did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was killed on that date, its case failed and the appellants were entitled to be acquitted. The trial judge referred to the conflicting evidence of Professor Pounder and Professor Busuttil before again directing the jury that if, having weighed all the evidence, they had any reasonable doubt that the deceased had been killed on 3 November, the Crown had failed to prove its case.
IV Post-trial events
The first appellant's appeal against conviction
[27] The first appellant appealed against conviction on grounds that
are not material to these proceedings.
The appeal was refused (cf Johnston
v HM Adv, 1997 SCCR 568).
Correspondence between the first appellant's solicitors and the Chief Constable and Crown Office
[28] In preparing for the trial Mr Stephen G Morrison, the first
appellant's solicitor, discovered that the defence witnesses who claimed to
have seen the deceased alive after 3 November had given information to that
effect to the police during the course of the murder enquiry. Mr Morrison was concerned that the police had
not conveyed this information to the procurator fiscal. After the trial he did not let the matter
rest. He is to be commended for his
professionalism. On
"I refer to our previous correspondence and would
advise you that I now have a report on this matter.
In this particular case there was more than
sufficient evidence to establish the time of death of Mr Forsyth, and it was
clear that any persons stating that they saw Mr Forsyth after
The Police alone did not simply form the view that
Mr Forsyth was murdered on 3rd November.
That belief was founded upon all the available evidence.
With regard to the penultimate paragraph of your
letter, a response was forthcoming following a press release and, indeed, responses
were obtained throughout the course of the enquiry. It became absolutely essential that any
information gleaned was carefully considered and where necessary sifted and
weeded.
During the course of any major enquiry much
information is amassed. Such enquiry is
wide-ranging and complex with teams of officers gathering and collating
evidence. There is a need, therefore,
for a senior officer to decide the course of enquiry, ensuring that all
evidence pertinent to the enquiry is revealed to the Procurator Fiscal in order
that he prepare his case.
In this particular case it became clear that the persons you name and indeed provided as witnesses were mistaken in their view and I am informed that their evidence was not readily accepted by the jury. Additionally, I am informed that the issues you raise were articulated during your client's trial and were not upheld by the trial judge.
In conclusion, it has always been the case that the
Police have discretion to discount any course of enquiry. It is the duty of a senior officer, where
information contrary to the real facts of the case is placed before him, to
make a decision based on his knowledge of the case and his experience. It is important that he ensures that all
material evidence is presented to the Procurator Fiscal in order that the
latter can prepare his case.
I am satisfied that my officers adopted the correct
course of action and sifted, despite your views, information which was
unnecessary. This was based on
experience of many years and there was most certainly no intent to suppress any
significant evidence."
The
report referred to in this letter has not been found in police files.
On
"I refer to previous correspondence and apologise
for the delay in letting you have a substantive response to your letter of
I understand from the Procurator Fiscal that he was
provided with all statements taken by the police in this case. These did not include statements of the
defence witnesses in question and I understand that the police do not have a
record of any statements having been taken from the defence witnesses. After the death of Andrew Forsyth the police
conducted what amounted virtually to door to door enquiries which involved a
very large number of persons being spoken to.
I am advised that no details were retained of the results of any
enquiries which were discounted during that process and, accordingly,
statements were not prepared.
You will of course be aware of the duties of the
police in investigating and reporting cases as described by Lord Justice-Clerk
Thomson in Smith 1952 JC 66,
including the power of selection in ensuring that evidence which is relevant
and material is put before the Procurator Fiscal."
The second paragraph of this letter
was based on untruthful information given by Fife Constabulary. The letter was also at odds with Deputy Chief
Constable Bennet's letter. The third
paragraph would perhaps have been better directed to the Deputy Chief
Constable.
[29] On
"I refer to previous correspondence and in
particular to the points raised by you in your letter of
In light of the experience of this case and
consideration of the matters which were previously raised by you, the Regional
Procurator Fiscal and District Procurator Fiscal arranged to meet the Deputy
Chief Constable to discuss the lessons of the case and in order to ensure that
the implications of Smith v HMA 1952
JC 66 were properly understood. Steps
have been taken to ensure that there is no doubt about the proper relationship
between the police and the Procurator Fiscal in this regard. The Lord Advocate and I are in no doubt that
the information which was provided to the police by the witnesses in this case
should indeed have been drawn to the attention of the Procurator Fiscal. That view is being made quite clear to the
police at the highest possible level as also is the Lord Advocate's request
that the issues which have arisen in this case be stressed in police training.
It will always be a matter for operational judgement
in each investigation to what extent and in what form information conveyed, in
particular during door to door type enquiries, should be recorded. In my letter of 5 July 1996 I informed you
that I understood from the Procurator Fiscal that he was provided with all
statements taken by the police in this case and that these did not include
statements of the defence witnesses in question and that I understood that the
police did not have a record of any statements having been taken from the
defence witnesses. I conveyed that
information to you on the basis of what the Procurator Fiscal had been told by
the police. In the course of further
discussions between the Regional Procurator Fiscal and the Procurator Fiscal
and the Deputy Chief Constable this matter has been further explored and it is
clear that the information which I gave you was inaccurate.
It is now clear that there was a limited computer
record in respect of one witness, a notebook entry in respect of the account of
another and a HOLMES computer record of the account of a third witness. While none of this material had been extended
into statements for submission to the Procurator Fiscal it is now clear that
the information which I previously conveyed to you in my letter of 5 July was
inaccurate and misleading in relation to the retention of the results of
enquiries by the police and the taking of statements. The Procurator Fiscal is satisfied that there
was no intention on the part of the police deliberately to mislead him in this
matter. The Lord Advocate has instructed
that it be made clear to the Chief Constable that it is wholly unacceptable
that misleading information was given to the Procurator Fiscal when these
matters were raised. Needless to say, he
very much regrets that any misleading information was conveyed to you.
As I hope I have made clear, lessons have, however,
been learned from the investigation of this case."
[30] With this long-delayed letter the Deputy Crown Agent formally
admitted that his letter of
[31] By 2000 the Commission had begun its investigation. It learned from Crown Office that the witness
in respect of whom there was a limited computer record was Margaret Drummond,
that the witness in respect of whom there was a police notebook entry was
Eileen Thow and that the witness in respect of whom there was a statement on
the HOLMES computer record was James Drummond.
Crown Office also disclosed that the existence of Eileen Thow, Janet
Thow, Margaret Drummond, James Drummond and Mary Brockie was unknown to the
procurator fiscal until the defence list of witnesses was intimated to him on
[32] The Commission then pursued its own investigations and
discovered that, contrary to the Deputy Crown Agent's letter of 3 February
1997, the police had had information regarding no fewer than 11 potential
witnesses to the fact that the deceased was alive after 3 November, namely
Eileen Thow, Janet Thow, Mary Brockie, James Drummond, Margaret Drummond, Alan
Henderson, Michael Healy, Karen Wheelwright, Mhairi Cormack, Robert Young and
Michael Franklin. The evidence that we
have heard shows that at that stage the police knew of other potential
witnesses to that fact. Even after the
Commission began its investigation the police rearguard action continued. An internal memorandum from D Supt Munro, as
he had then become, to his colleague D Insp Watson was recovered by the
Commission. It is date-stamped
"I think you should provide all reports to the PF
but highlight that these were internal for police eyes only. You should make the point that when I and DS
Nessell, as reporting officers took the papers to Mr Hamilton, PF, we informed
him that there were a number of other peripheral witnesses which we did not
consider worthy of inclusion at that time.
He said that was fine and if necessary he could see them during police
precognitions. No police officers
were precognosced.
As outlined in the reports the witnesses that were
known to me were not submitted for the reasons given. I have subsequently learned that other
individuals have come to light but this was not known to the reporting officers
at the time. Contact me if you require
anything else.
PS It may be
worth mentioning that these decisions were made in 1995, before the
requirements of ECHR and in the absence of directions on disclosure."
In the second paragraph Mr Munro
does not name the individuals to whom he is referring. From the history of the enquiry that we shall
outline, we conclude that all relevant witnesses had come to the notice of the
police before the case was reported to the procurator fiscal. Mr Munro could not assist us on this
memorandum. He said that he had no
recollection of it.
V The evidence heard by this
court
(1)
Evidence that the deceased was alive after 3 November
(a) Witnesses who gave evidence at the trial
[33] Eileen Thow spent
[34] Mary Brockie knew the deceased by sight. His flat was at the top of her street. On Monday 6 November she left her house at
[35] Janet Thow was the licensee of Jinty's Bar in
[36] James Drummond again spoke to the occasion on Tuesday 7
November when he and his wife walked through the Glen at about
[37] PC John Mathieson, now retired, confirmed the evidence that he
gave at the trial that on Tuesday 7 November at about
[38] Alan Henderson was a part-time pools collector. He knew the deceased slightly. On Friday 10 November he went to the incident
caravan and reported that on Thursday 9 November at
[39] We found each of these witnesses to be credible and reliable. They were transparently honest people who tried to tell the truth to the best of their recollection. The only material point of uncertainty was in the evidence of Alan Henderson. We believe his evidence that he saw the deceased after 3 November; but, having regard to the pathologists' evidence, we think it more likely that it was on Tuesday 7, rather than Thursday 9, that he saw him.
(b) New witnesses
[40] Michael
Healy owned a newsagent's shop in
[41] Mhairi
Cormack was a senior housing officer with Dunfermline District Council. She had no recollection of having given a
statement to the police on
[42] Robert Young too looked in the window, which he mistakenly thought was the bedroom window. He definitely did not see a body, although he accepted that the light was not good.
[43] John Thow knew the deceased as an occasional customer at the Rendezvous Bar and at Jinty's Bar. When he learned of his death on Thursday 9 or Friday 10 November, he remembered that he had last seen him in Jinty's Bar on the morning of Friday 3 November. The deceased's face was uninjured. He told the police that Michael Franklin had told him that he had seen the deceased in Jinty's Bar in the afternoon of Wednesday 8 November.
[44] Michael
Franklin is dead. In an affidavit dated
[45] Paul King
is not mentioned in the Commission's referrals.
He is imprisoned for a murder committed in December 1995. He said that the police interviewed him about
the death of the deceased on Sunday 12 November. He had known the deceased since he was a boy. He remembered having seen him on Wednesday 8
November. He left work that day at
[46] Karen
Wheelwright knew the deceased well. She
was at school with his brother. She
learned of his death from a television broadcast in which it was said that he
had been murdered on 3 November. She
realised that she had spoken to him after that date. She said that on 7, 8 or 9 November between 11.00
and
(2) Evidence of the pathologists
[47] We have the impression that Professor Pounder's evidence before
us on the question of time of death was more guarded than it was at the
trial. He accepted that from the post
mortem report one could conclude that the body had been dead for more than 24
hours. It followed, therefore, that
signs of putrefaction gave the best indication of time of death; but the state
of putrefaction was dependent on ambient temperatures. In attempting to reach a view as to time of
death, he would ask the police for such information as they had as to when the
deceased was last seen alive and when the body was found. This was because circumstantial evidence was
often much better than medical evidence.
The assessment of time of death depended largely on evidence of past
sightings. He accepted that the
estimation of time of death was not an exact science and that a reliable
observation of the deceased alive would overturn any scientific opinion to the
contrary. Whatever scientific inferences
could be drawn from the state of putrefaction must yield to any contrary
evidence based upon a reliable observation that the deceased was alive. If there was reliable evidence that the
deceased was alive within three days of the post mortem, then, for whatever
reason, the findings of the post mortem were anomalous. Experience had taught him that, even applying
science, one could make an error over time of death. He said that he would find it difficult to
accept that the deceased was seen alive on Wednesday 8 November; but that that
was not impossible.
[48] Professor Pounder was emphatic that he did not express the view
that the deceased died on 3 November. He
said "I would never have pinned my colours to the mast and said that death
occurred on 3 November." But by the time
of the post mortem he believed that the police had concluded that that was the
date of death. After the post mortem,
the police did not return to him to ask for his view on the point in the light
of further evidence.
[49] Professor Busuttil adhered to the opinion that he gave at the
trial. Taking into account rigor mortis,
putrefaction, the internal state of the body and the ambient temperature, he
concluded that the deceased had been dead for between 24 and 48 hours before
Professor Pounder's post mortem. He said
that a sighting of the deceased alive on the afternoon of 8 November was "not
impossible, but we're stretching it."
The possibility of a sighting on 7 November was "much more likely." Sightings in the period 5 to 7 November were
entirely consistent with his theory of time of death.
[50] Like Professor Pounder, Professor Busuttil accepted that in the
inexact science of estimating time of death the pathologist should take into
account reliable eye-witness evidence of sightings of the deceased and of the
finding of the body. He positively
excluded the possibility that death occurred on 3 November because that was
inconsistent with the process of decomposition and with his own findings.
[51] Although this is an appeal against conviction and not an
inquiry into the conduct of the police, it is nevertheless necessary, for a
proper understanding of the grounds of appeal, that we should set out in detail
our findings as to the history of the enquiry and those aspects of it that have
led to these referrals.
[52] Evidence about the police enquiry was given by seven police
officers who took part in it; namely WPC, now WDC, Amanda Givan; DC, now D
Insp, Kenneth Chatham; DC, now DC Insp, Colin Hershaw; DC, now DS, Lindsay
Black; DC, now Insp, James McCluskey; DC, now Insp, Colin Caldwell, and the
former D Insp Munro. We shall refer to
these officers who are still in service by the ranks that they held at the time
of the enquiry.
[53] We regret to say that we did not find Mr Munro to be a credible
witness. He was taken point by point
through the inadequacies and irregularities in the enquiry procedures. He was unable to give us a satisfactory
explanation of any of them. He
repeatedly dealt with counsel's questions by saying that he had no explanation
to give; or that he could not recall what had happened; or that a particular
irregularity was the fault of D Insp McEwan or of lower-ranking officers whom
he was unable to name. In the result, he
accepted no personal responsibility for any of the misconduct that this case
has brought to light. Much of his
evidence was untruthful, in our view.
[54] With the exception of WPC Givan, the other officers from the
enquiry team who gave evidence did not impress us. There is no evidence directly implicating any
of them individually in the suppression or alteration of statements; but,
despite the senior ranks that some of them now hold, we were not satisfied that
they told us the whole truth. It was our
clear impression that they knew more than they were prepared to admit.
[55] WPC Givan, however, assisted the parties and the court by
retrieving all of the information that can be found in the HOLMES records of
the case. We accept her as a witness of
credit whose only concern was to search for the truth.
[56] We also heard evidence from Alexandra Adamson, who was present
when Karen Wheelwright gave her police statement, and from Robert Hamilton, who
was procurator fiscal of
VI The conduct of the police
enquiry
[57] The enquiry used the original version of the HOLMES
software. This system classifies the
witnesses by serial number and creates for each a nominal record in which
numbered actions and statements are recorded, priorities given to actions and
statements are classified and cross-references are noted with other
witnesses. When an action is initiated
from the incident room and allocated to a specified officer, it is noted and
timed and the result of it is added to the file. A statement taken in pursuance of an action
is given to the receiver in the incident room and a printed version is
thereafter entered in the system. A
statement reader then decides what actions, if any, to raise in the light of it
and classifies the priority to be given to it.
The senior investigating officer (SIO) would not normally be working in
the incident room or allocating actions.
He would liaise with the officer in charge of the incident room, namely
in this case D Insp McEwan. The SIO
would give regular briefings to the enquiry team and to those in the incident
room and report on progress.
[58] WPC Givan did not work in the incident room. She is an experienced trainer in the HOLMES
system. She said that because the
statements in this case had been dealt with under the original version of
HOLMES, there was no audit trail as to who inputted the statements into the
system. It had an audit trail for
actions only.
[59] For the purposes of these referrals, the first significant
stage in the enquiry was the post mortem.
At the post mortem Professor Pounder and Dr Cox could not express an
opinion as to the time of death. This is
confirmed by a note in Mr Munro's handwriting that has been recovered from
police files. It was made by him on
information reported to him during or just after the post mortem. It contains the comment "no indication time
of death." Professor Pounder requested
that the police should obtain the average daily temperatures for
[60] On 10 November the police set up a major incident enquiry. They brought an incident caravan to the locus
and carried out house to house interviews.
Despite the post mortem finding that there was no indication of time of
death, the police committed themselves within 24 to 48 hours of the discovery
of the body to the theory that the death occurred on Friday 3 November. They based this theory almost entirely on the
information given to them by the drinking associates of the deceased whose
evidence we have summarised. But, as is
now agreed, numerous witnesses came to their notice who spoke to having seen
the deceased alive after that date.
[61] Mr Munro at first told us that he believed that the police
contacted the pathologists once they had information that the death took place
on 3 November. That evidence was
contradicted by Professor Pounder, it was not vouched by any contemporaneous
document and we did not believe it. Mr
Munro later said that he himself had not pursued the question with the
pathologists, and could not say whether other officers did so. He did not know which officers would have
dealt with that aspect. All the evidence
establishes that the police did not consult the pathologists on the question of
time of death at any time after the post mortem.
[62] On 10 November at
[63] Mr Munro was unable to explain any of this. He said that he did not deal with that matter
himself. On the note of the police
action in relation to Miss Cormack there is a handwritten note "NFA [sc no further action] meantime." Mr Munro suggested that the statement might
have been filed because of an oversight on the part of D Insp McEwan. He said that he could not identify the
handwriting on the note. He said that it
must be that of someone in the incident room.
[64] On 10 November Mary Brockie was interviewed in the course of the house to house enquiry. She said that she had seen the deceased on Monday 6 November. Her completed house to house enquiry form was not entered in the HOLMES system. She was thereafter interviewed by the police; but there is no trace of her statement in police records. She was again interviewed on the eve of the trial by Mr Munro, as we shall relate.
[65] On the same
day Alan Henderson gave a statement at the incident caravan that he had seen
the deceased in
[66] On 10 November at
[67] At the same time DC Hershaw interviewed Margaret Drummond. Some brief notes of the interview are in the
HOLMES system under the description of a statement numbered S17. According to these notes, Mrs Drummond
expressly referred to her sighting of the deceased in "the Glen," but this
information was given a "low" priority.
In the nominal record relating to Mrs Drummond (witness N76) there is
noted "N76 describes deceased clothing - negative statement." Mrs Drummond's original police statement has
not been found. It may have been
recorded in DC Hershaw's notebook. Fife
Constabulary were unable to provide the notebook when required to do so by the
procurator fiscal.
[68] At about this time, Michael Franklin was interviewed in the
course of the house to house enquiry. He
told the police that he had been with the deceased in Jinty's Bar on Wednesday
8 November. The police hinted to him
that he was probably mistaken about this.
There is no trace of his house to house interview form in the police
records. He was not interviewed
thereafter.
[69] On Saturday
11 November at
[70] Neither DC
Chatham nor DC Hershaw could say why or by whom the handwritten statement of Mr
Thow was altered. DC Chatham suggested
that it would have been altered by someone at or above Inspector level. He said that after a statement was recorded
by a police officer it could be changed only by, or on the initiative of, the
officer in charge of the enquiry. He
agreed with the suggestion of counsel for
[71] Mr Thow confirmed to us that he definitely told the police about the remark made to him by Michael Franklin. We believe him. On the other hand, he could not recall having said to them that he did not know who killed Drew. We do not believe that he said that.
[72] An action
record was created for Michael Franklin.
It was given "high" priority. It
was cross-referenced to John Thow. On 11
November at
[73] In the action record print relating to Michael Franklin, his possible sighting of the deceased early in the afternoon of 8 November is timed at "about 1345 hrs." Neither Mr Munro nor DC Chatham could explain where this timing came from. There is nothing in the HOLMES record to show its source.
[74] Janet Thow gave a statement to the police at about the same time as her husband about her sighting of the deceased on 6 November. There is no trace of it in the police files. There is no nominal record for Mrs Thow in the HOLMES system.
[75] As a result of the statements of John and Janet Thow, it came
to the notice of the police that their daughter Eileen Thow had relevant
evidence to give. Eileen Thow gave a
statement to the police some days after her parents. The significance of it was unmistakable. She had reason to remember that she had seen
the deceased in the Rendezvous Bar on the night of Sunday 5 November. She could relate that to her visit to
[76] On Sunday 12 November DC McCluskey in response to an action
(A13) raised on 11 November, and on 12 November raised to "priority 1," took a
statement in his own handwriting from Paul King at Dunfermline Police Station
in the presence of PC Tait. The
statement was unsigned. It recorded King
as having said that he had seen the deceased about a week earlier, that he
could not remember the exact date and that he had seen him at the phone boxes
near
"I think
In the printed version
these were deleted and there were substituted the words "I can identify
[77] On Monday 13 November at
[78] The printed version of Miss Wheelwright's statement recovered from the HOLMES system has been edited. Certain words have been scored out. DC Black reported inter alia that a full statement had been noted from her regarding a sighting of the deceased "last week;" but the nominal record for this witness under the heading of cross references says "Alleged sighting of [deceased] 09.11.95 unmarked facially, nothing relevant." DC Black said that he did not make that entry in the nominal record. He agreed that the alleged sighting was relevant. Mr Munro said that he had no knowledge of Miss Wheelwright's statement.
[79] Karen Wheelwright was not re-interviewed. In the handwritten statement DC Black had noted Alexandra Adamson's particulars. That lead was not followed up. In Karen Wheelwright's HOLMES file there is no cross reference to Alexandra Adamson.
[80] By letter dated 14 November Mr
[81] Thursday 16 November at 1.05 pm Michael Healy telephoned the
police and told them that he had seen the deceased in his shop on 4 November
1995 at about 6.30 am. DC McCluskey took
a statement (S97) in his own handwriting from Mr Healy at
[82] Meanwhile, on 14 November an action (A152) was raised and
allocated to DC Chatham and DC Broadley to re-interview Margaret Drummond
"specifically in regard to the movements of [the deceased] on 03111995." The following result of it is noted in the
handwriting of WDC Beveridge "Drummond re-interviewed - no need for further
statement - nothing further learned other than she may be mistaken by the
sighting of the victim on Tuesday (
[83] On 17 November an action (A153) dated 14 November to
"re-interview James Drummond N17 specifically in relation to the movements of
[the deceased] 03111995" was re-allocated to WDC Beveridge and DC Beattie and
completed on 21 November. That resulted
in a further unsigned statement by James Drummond dated 21 November (S10A) in
which he is recorded as having said of the sighting on 7 November "It was then
I thought I saw [the deceased] in the park, but I cannot be sure." Mr Munro concluded that this statement "cast
doubt on his veracity." When Mr Munro
and other officers saw this statement they decided that Mr Drummond had been
mistaken. The statement was classified
as "Noted not required for court purposes" and was filed. DC Hershaw said that the decision to file it
would be taken by Mr Munro. In the
nominal record itself there is no mention of a sighting by Mr Drummond on 7
November.
[84] At about this time, Mr Munro drafted his own witness statement
setting out the background to the crime, the discovery of the body and the
course of the enquiry. He did not
mention any reported sightings of the deceased after 3 November.
[85] Mr
Munro failed to meet the procurator fiscal's deadline for submission of all
statements in the case. By letter dated
22 November addressed to the Detective Chief Superintendent, Western Division,
[86] The statements submitted with the letter included only one by a
witness whose evidence suggested that the deceased was alive after 3 November,
namely John Thow; but his statement was the fabricated version from which the
reference to
[87] Mr Munro admitted that he withheld the statements of John
Drummond and Alan Henderson. He said
that he did so because "they were mistaken."
He said that he had no knowledge of any other statement that suggested
that the deceased was alive after 3 November.
We do not believe that.
[88] Mr Hamilton sent the police witness list to the defence agents
with the side notes blanked out. He
confirmed that he was not made aware of any evidence that the deceased was
alive after 3 November. He said that, if
he had been, he would have reported the matter to Crown Office for
instructions. The straightforward
conclusion that we draw is that he was prevented from knowing that the date of
death was even an issue in the case.
Pre-trial interviews
[89] On
[90] On
[91] None of these statements was signed. This was the first time that the police had
obtained corroboration of Eileen Thow's evidence about her movements on 5
November.
[92] On the same day, Mr Munro took a statement from Mary
Brockie. He was not accompanied by
another officer. In it he recorded Mrs
Brockie as having said "I did not know Drew Forsyth either to speak to or by
sight." Mrs Brockie denied having said
this. She said that that was plainly
wrong. Mr Munro also recorded Mrs
Brockie as having said:
"That day I was in
the shop opposite talking to Margaret Drummond (witness) when I told her I
didn't know who the person was who had been murdered. She described him to me and I said I thought
I had maybe seen him going to the shop for a paper. I then told her that it was maybe the same
person I had seen coming out of the house on the Monday (
Mrs
Brockie said that that too was wrong because she knew that it was the
deceased. We believe Mrs Brockie. In our view, this was Mr Munro's version of
what he wished her evidence to be. This
statement was not entered in the HOLMES system.
It may be contrasted with Mrs Brockie's evidence at the trial. In her evidence in chief, she was clear that
it was the deceased whom she saw. She
said "I'm, I'm one hundred per cent it was Andrew." She rejected the suggestion in
cross-examination that she was mistaken.
[93] On
[94] On
[95] The police did not take a statement from Alan Henderson.
The scope of the appeal
[96] The statutory ground on which the Commission has referred the
case (1995 Act, s 194C) reflects the fact that there is now one general ground
of appeal, namely miscarriage of justice (1995 Act, s 106(3)). This ground may take many specific forms,
such as misdirection of the jury, wrongful admission or exclusion of evidence
or procedural irregularity. Section
106(3) refers to two specific grounds of appeal, namely fresh evidence (1995
Act s 106(3)(a)) and unreasonable verdict (s 106(3)(b)); but these are not independent grounds. They are merely instances of ways in which a
miscarriage of justice may be alleged to have occurred.
[97] The advocate depute approached this case on the basis that in
both aspects it was a fresh evidence appeal, the fresh evidence being that of
eye witnesses on the question of the date of death; the documentary evidence
recovered from police files, and the oral evidence of certain officers
concerning the conduct of the enquiry.
He submitted that all of this evidence, even if it had been available to
the jury, would not have outweighed the compelling evidence of the appellants'
guilt; and, in any event, that all of it when taken together did not compel us
to conclude that the verdict must be regarded as a miscarriage of justice.
[98] In our
opinion, the advocate depute's submission is based upon an incomplete view of
the case. The appellants have tabled an
appeal on the ground of fresh evidence; but they have also tabled a separate
ground that is foreshadowed in the referrals, namely that the misconduct of the
police deprived them of a fair trial and accordingly caused a miscarriage of
justice. They have led an impressive
body of new as well as previously heard evidence of the fact that the deceased
was alive after 3 November. That was the
central line of defence at the trial.
But the appellants have also led evidence relating to the conduct of the
police investigation. The evidence on
this point is in a sense fresh evidence; but it is not evidence on the issue in
the indictment. It is evidence as to the
separate issue of the fairness of the trial (cf McPhee v HM Adv, unrepd,
Fresh evidence as to the date of
death
[99] The question whether the deceased was murdered on 3 November or
was alive after that date was a classic jury question (cf King v HM Adv, 1999 SCCR
330; Roy Dickson Smith v HM Adv, unrepd, 19 January 2005). It is not suggested that, on the evidence led
at the trial, the jury returned a verdict that no reasonable jury, properly
directed, could have returned (1995 Act, s 106(3)(b)).
[100] An appeal of this kind should be concerned with new evidence
rather than with a repetition of evidence given at the trial. In our view, the evidence that we heard from
PC Mathieson and the six defence witnesses who gave evidence at the trial, so
far as it related to the time of death, was simply their previous evidence in
an expanded form. It was not "evidence
which was not heard at the original proceedings" (s 106(3)(a)); and for that
reason alone it cannot found an appeal.
[101] In any event, in relation to the trial witnesses it is not for us
to usurp the function of the jury. It is
not our assessment of these witnesses that matters. The evidence of PC Mathieson and the six
defence witnesses appeared to us to be credible and reliable; but we did not
hear all of the evidence on which the Crown relied at the trial, nor did we
hear the evidence of the appellants themselves.
We are therefore not in as good a position as the jury were in to assess
the overall impact of the whole evidence in the trial. The jury preferred the evidence for the Crown
to that for the defence. It was for the
jury to make such a judgment on the basis of their own appraisal of the
evidence. In the circumstances, it would
be a discourtesy on our part to express an opinion one way or the other on the
jury's verdict.
[102] Nevertheless, the evidence of those witnesses has helped us to
assess the impact that the new evidence would have had upon the jury if it too
had been heard; and certain of those witnesses have given crucial new evidence
on the separate issue of police misconduct.
[103] In our view, this ground of appeal must be decided on the
evidence of the new witnesses indicating that the deceased was alive after 3
November. That is significant evidence
having a direct bearing on a critical issue at the trial. In our view, it was capable of being accepted
by a reasonable jury as being both credible and reliable. The Crown concedes that there is a reasonable
explanation why it was not given at the trial (s 106(3)(a); (3A)). The question is whether it is of such
significance that we may reasonably conclude that a verdict returned in
ignorance of its existence "must" be regarded as a miscarriage of justice (Cameron v HM Adv, 1987 SCCR 608, Lord Justice General Emslie at pp 618-619;
cf Kidd v HM Adv, 2000 SCCR 513, at paras [23]-[24]).
[104] The advocate depute submitted that the new witnesses merely added
further evidence on an issue that the defence brought out at the trial, was the
subject of considerable evidence and was identified as a decisive issue in the
trial judge's charge. Since there were
seven witnesses at the trial to the fact that the deceased was alive after 3
November 1995, the defence case on the point was squarely before the jury and
must be held to have been rejected by them in the light of the evidence of the
assault on the deceased on that day and Professor Pounder's evidence about the
time of death. Of the trial witnesses
who spoke to having seen the deceased after 3 November none was more compelling
than Eileen Thow. She was the only one
who claimed to have spoken to him. Her
evidence pinpointing 5 November as the date of the conversation was
strongly corroborated. Despite her
evidence, the jury convicted. It was
unlikely that the new evidence would have added any further strength to the
defence case. In view of the compelling
evidence that the appellants committed the murder on 3 November, it could not
be said that a verdict returned in ignorance of the new evidence must be
regarded as a miscarriage of justice.
[105] Counsel for the appellants submitted that the sheer volume of the
additional evidence, when added to the defence evidence led at the trial, and
the credibility and reliability of the witnesses who gave it, were such that
the test in Cameron (supra) was met.
[106] In view of Paul King's demeanour in the witness box and the inconsistency between his evidence and his police statement as to the date on which he saw the deceased and as to the identity of the girl who was with the deceased, we did not accept him as a credible witness. Counsel for the appellants did not rely on his evidence and we need not consider it further. However, we considered that the other new witnesses were respectable and honest people on whose evidence we could rely. Their evidence satisfied us that the deceased was not murdered on 3 November. The only point of material uncertainty was in the evidence of Karen Wheelwright as to the date on which she saw the deceased. We believe her evidence that she saw him after 3 November; but, having regard to the pathologists' evidence, we think that that sighting cannot have been on 9 November.
[107] Two sources of evidence raised special considerations, namely the evidence of Mhairi Cormack and the affidavit of Michael Franklin. Miss Cormack was unable to recall any of the matters mentioned in her statement to the police; but she was emphatic that the statement that she made at the time was an accurate account of what she had seen and done at the locus, and she was content to adopt it as her evidence. Her account was supported by Robert Young whose evidence we accept. Michael Franklin's affidavit is admissible as evidence of what it contains (1995 Act, s 259(1)(a), 2(a)). It is supported by the evidence of John Thow, which we accept. We therefore accept the accounts set out in Miss Cormack's statement and Mr Franklin's affidavit as being true and accurate.
[108] Our conclusions on the new evidence are that
Michael Healy spoke with the deceased on 4 November; that Karen Wheelwright
spoke with him in the morning of 7 or 8 November; that Michael Franklin spoke
with him in the early afternoon of 8 November; and that when Mhairi Cormack and
Robert Young looked into the deceased's flat on 7 November, he was not there.
[109] Those are our own conclusions; but the
critical question is what effect this evidence would have had on the minds of
the jury if they had heard it. In our
opinion, the new evidence would have greatly increased the strength of the defence
case. We incline to think that the more
evidence the jury had heard as to the deceased's having been alive after 3
November, the greater would have been the likelihood of an acquittal.
[110] We do not accept the submission of the
advocate depute that the new evidence was merely more of the same. It had a special significance of its
own. Of the six trial witnesses who said
that they saw the deceased alive after 3 November, only Eileen Thow had been
close enough to speak to him; whereas of the four new witnesses who said that
they saw him after that date, three, namely Michael Healy, Karen Wheelwright
and Michael Franklin, had spoken to him.
The new evidence is therefore much stronger in this respect. Karen Wheelwright's credibility and
reliability would have been supported to some extent by Alexandra Adamson.
[111] Moreover, if the jury had heard the evidence
of Michael Healy, Karen Wheelwright, Michael Franklin, Mhairi Cormack and
Robert Young, they would have been bound to see that, like that of PC Mathieson
and the six defence witnesses whose evidence they heard, it came from honest,
decent people who had no motive to tell anything but the whole truth. The likelihood that all twelve of these
witnesses were mistaken would have been difficult for the jury to accept. If all of this evidence had been led, it
would have had a vital bearing on the question of reasonable doubt as to the
date of death, on which the trial judge had specifically directed the jury.
[112] The evidence of Miss Cormack and Mr Young
would have also have been significant in relation to other evidence. They supported the view that the deceased was
alive in the afternoon of Monday 7 November; but they also supported the view
that he was out of doors that day around the time at which James and Margaret
Drummond said that they saw him in the Glen.
They also supported the evidence of PC Mathieson that there was no body
to be seen in the flat about four hours later.
[113] Furthermore, in the light of John Thow's
evidence that the deceased's face was uninjured when he saw him on the morning
of Friday 3 November, Michael Healy's evidence that on the morning of Saturday
4 November the deceased had a mark next to his left eye would have supported
the defence case that a minor fight had taken place at the deceased's flat on
the previous night.
[114] We are confirmed in these conclusions by the
evidence that we heard from Professor Pounder and Professor Busuttil. In our opinion, all of the new evidence would
have been powerfully supported by Professor Busuttil's opinion that death
occurred after 3 November. Furthermore,
if that evidence had been led, Professor Pounder, as we now know, would have
accepted in relation to it that the post mortem signs of time of death must
yield to credible evidence of eye-witnesses who saw the deceased alive after
that time, however anomalous the post mortem findings might then seem.
[115] In our opinion, the strength of the new
evidence is such that we may justifiably conclude that a verdict returned in
ignorance of it constituted a miscarriage of justice.
Police misconduct
[116] Counsel for the appellants submitted that by improperly
suppressing material evidence concerning the time of death, the police
prevented the defence from putting forward their strongest case and restricted
their cross-examination of Crown witnesses regarding the conduct of the
enquiry. The advocate depute said that
he wished to make no submission as to the conduct of the police other than to
say that the full explanation of the suppression and alteration of evidence had
yet to come to light and that the Crown did not regard that matter as
closed. He relied on his basic
submission that it had not been shown that the availability of the missing
evidence would have materially affected the outcome of the trial.
[117] In the Scottish system of criminal investigation the procurator
fiscal directs the investigation and not the police. In the early stages of an investigation, the
police almost always act on their own initiative; but it is their duty to
report on their investigation to the procurator fiscal and to act upon his
further instructions. They have no
authority to be selective in the potentially relevant information that they
report, or to substitute their own judgment for that of the procurator fiscal
as to the significance or otherwise of information that has a bearing on the
charge.
[118] Although the Crown's obligation of disclosure of evidence is more
formally regulated now than it was at the time of this enquiry, the obligation
itself is of long standing. It is based
on the principle that in the interests of justice the defence should not be
kept in ignorance of evidence that could assist its case. An aspect of this principle is the
long-established practice by which prosecutors lead evidence that may be
unfavourable to the Crown case where it is relevant to the issue. If the Crown had known of the witnesses whose
evidence was withheld from it, those witnesses would undoubtedly have been on
the Crown list.
[119] If the police had reported fully on the question of time of
death, the Crown might well have retained the latitude taken in the charge in
its original form; but in that event the defence might have been in a strong
position to suggest that there was no evidence of an assault on the deceased by
either of the appellants on any date after 3 November.
[120] The Commission has reached the following conclusion in both referrals.
"In all the circumstances the Commission has found it difficult to conclude other than that the police took it upon themselves to filter out the existence of witnesses whose evidence might point to the deceased having been alive after November 3. These actions prevented the Crown from obtaining a complete picture of the movements of the deceased in the time immediately prior to his death, a picture which might have altered the way in which the case was prosecuted. The Commission also believes that the defence put forward on behalf of [the appellant] would have been presented in different terms had counsel been aware of the full extent of the sightings of the deceased after 3 November. These actions by the police resulted in the jury not being made aware of the full time scale and range of movements of the deceased in the days immediately following the supposed date of his death."
We agree.
[121] At an early stage in their enquiries, and mainly on the word of certain unsatisfactory witnesses, the enquiry team decided that the murder had been committed on Friday 3 November. Thereafter they obstinately rejected all evidence that did not fit their theory. They did so despite the mounting body of evidence of later sightings of the deceased by credible witnesses. They decided that any witness whose evidence did not fit their theory must be mistaken. As more and more evidence emerged of sightings of the deceased after 3 November, the police refrained from seeking expert advice from Professor Pounder on the question of time of death. They also refrained from pursuing certain obvious and necessary enquiries with other witnesses who might support the possibility that the deceased was alive after 3 November.
[122] The
misguided attitude of the police is well illustrated in the letter dated
[123] But the conduct of the police went beyond obstinacy. They suppressed and altered evidence casting doubt on their theory of the date of death. When they reported the case to the procurator fiscal, they suppressed the statements of Mhairi Cormack, James Drummond, Margaret Drummond, Karen Wheelwright and Michael Healy; they submitted altered versions of the statements of John Thow and Paul King; they falsified John Thow's statement by excluding the crucial reference to Michael Franklin; they did not mention the information that had been given to them in various forms by Mary Brockie, Alan Henderson, Janet Thow, Eileen Thow and Michael Franklin indicating that the deceased was alive after 3 November; and they did not mention that Robert Young and Alexandra Adamson were potential witnesses on that issue. It was the duty of the reporting officers to submit all of this information to the procurator fiscal. In the result, their report contained only one statement, that of PC Mathieson, that could be thought to raise a question as to the date of death; but that statement did not relate to a positive sighting of the deceased and, in the context of the other evidence, did not exclude the possibility that the deceased was lying dead in the flat at the material time. The evidence suppressed by the police was vital. The suppression of it was improper.
[124] Thereafter, when the defence intimated certain witnesses who would speak to the deceased's having been alive after 3 November, the police attempted to cast doubt on their reliability and in at least one case, that of Mary Brockie, Mr Munro attributed to her a statement that she obviously did not make.
[125] The police
misconduct did not end with the trial.
Fife Constabulary continued to mislead Crown Office in relation to the
Deputy Crown Agent's letters of
[126] In the letter of 3 February the Deputy Crown Agent said that the procurator fiscal was satisfied that there was no intention on the part of the police deliberately to mislead him. That is not our conclusion. On the fuller information available to us, we conclude that the police deliberately misled the Crown in a serious way. The result was that the procurator fiscal, and in consequence the defence, were kept unaware of evidence having a material bearing on a vital issue. The police thereby induced the Crown to adopt the police theory of the date of the murder and to challenge the credibility and reliability of any defence witness who cast doubt on it. That, in our opinion, was grave misconduct.
[127] However, for the purposes of these references, it is sufficient
for us to say that the appellants were deprived of the opportunity to lead all
of the evidence that would have been favourable to their defence and of arguing
its full significance before the jury.
They were therefore deprived of a fair trial. In this respect, too, they suffered a
miscarriage of justice.
VIII Disposal
[128] We shall allow both appeals and quash the
convictions and the sentences.