OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION

 

[2006] CSOH 148

 

P1788/04

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OPINION OF

J GORDON REID Q.C. F.C.I.Arb

Sitting as a Temporary Judge

 

in the Petition of

 

(FIRST) JOHN BILLIG

(SECOND) ALLIED STERLING PLC

 

Petitioners;

 

for Judicial Review

 

of a decision of the Council of

the Law Society of Scotland

made under section 43

of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980

 

 

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­________________

 

 

 

Petitioners: Dean of Faculty, Wolffe; Simpson & Marwick

Alt: Johnston Q.C., Munro; Brodies

 

 

20 September 2006

 

Introduction

[1] This Petition for Judicial Review relates to a decision by the Council of the Law Society of Scotland (the "Council") dated 30 April 2004. The Council has refused to make a grant out of the Scottish Solicitors Guarantee Fund in favour of the Petitioners who suffered loss through the dishonesty of a solicitor, Michael Mullen, who was, at the material time, enrolled on the Register of Solicitors in Scotland. The losses concern certain loan transactions and the granting of letters of undertaking by Mr Mullen whereby he irrevocably and unconditionally undertook personally to repay the loans being made to his client.

[2] At the First Hearing, which took place on 4, 5, 6 and 13 July 2006, the Petitioners sought inter alia decrees of declarator and reduction of the Council's decision, and the Respondents, the Council, sought dismissal. The issues debated before me raised questions about the administration of the Scottish Solicitors Guarantee Fund (the "Guarantee Fund") currently established by section 43 of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980 (the "1980 Act"). There is a lengthy history to these claims. The background leading up to the decision under challenge is well documented and is not seriously in dispute. Although there are two petitioners, counsel did not draw any distinction between them in their submissions, and I have not done so.

[3] The issues debated before me largely concerned the question (which can be expressed in a variety of ways) whether there was material before the Council entitling them to make a finding of negligence on the part of the Petitioners, and if there was not, whether the Council had a general or residual statutory discretion to refuse to make a grant, and whether the proceedings therefore fell to be remitted to the Council to consider the exercise of any such statutory discretion. Other related questions were also debated and fall to be determined.

[4] Finally, by way of introduction, I record that the petitioners tendered a short Minute of Amendment which substituted declaratory craves for branches (3) and (4) of Article 3 of the Statement of Facts. The amendment was not opposed and I allowed it.

 

Statutory Background

[5] A compensation fund was established in England and Wales by the Solicitors Act 1941 for the purpose of relieving or mitigating losses sustained by any person in consequence of dishonesty on the part of any solicitor. Section 2 of that Act provided inter alia that

"(1) A fund to be called "the Compensation Fund" shall be established ... By the Society for enabling the society to make grants thereout in any cases which the Council think suitable for such treatment and in their absolute discretion decide so to treat, for the purpose of relieving or mitigating losses sustained by any person in consequence of dishonesty on the part of any solicitor ..."

[6] The Legal Aid and Solicitors (Scotland) Bill was enacted in 1949; it created the Law Society of Scotland and introduced legal aid and advice. It also established the Scottish Solicitors Guarantee Scheme. When debated in Parliament, it was stated that the Bill inter alia provided "for the establishment of a guarantee fund to compensate persons who may suffer loss by reason of the dishonesty of a solicitor to whom money has been entrusted" (Hansard, Business of the House 16/12/48 columns 1402-3). Before the House of Commons Standing Committee on 5/4/49, the Lord Advocate of the day stated that the provisions were

"to cover one of the great injustices that has sometimes occurred in legal circles, where unfortunately a solicitor may have gone off the rails; he may have embezzled money belonging to a client, and the client has unfortunately had to go without any proper compensation because the solicitor's estate has not been sufficient to provide proper compensation.

 

In assessing what the compensation should be, provision is made in this Clause that the compensation should be the compensation which, in the opinion of the Council of the Law Society, will be appropriate. It may be total compensation, or it may be partial compensation, because subsection (3) makes provision for the limiting of the compensation if there has been negligence on the part of the client. We feel that it has to be left very largely on a discretionary basis, having regard to the merits of each case." (column 367)

[7] When the Bill was considered in the House of Lords for its Second Reading on 17 July 1949, the Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Works (Lord Morrison) stated inter alia that

"... Clause 22 ... provides for the establishment of a Guarantee Fund to compensate persons who may suffer loss by reason of dishonesty on the part of any solicitor or a servant of his. A similar Guarantee Fund already exists in England, and the establishment of such a fund in Scotland, which has been voluntarily proposed by the profession, will be welcomed by the public ..." (column 985)

[8] Section 22 of the 1949 Act provided inter alia that

"(2) ... the Guarantee Fund shall be held by the society for the purposes of making grants in order to compensate persons who in the opinion of the Council ... suffer pecuniary loss by reason of dishonesty on the part of any solicitor ...

(3) ... The Council may refuse to make a grant or may make a grant only to a limited extent if they are of the opinion that there has been negligence on the part of the applicant or of any person for whom he is responsible which has contributed to the loss in question ..."

[9] The relevant provisions of the English 1941 Act were substantially re-enacted in section 32 of the Solicitors Act 1957. By subsection (2) it was provided that if loss sustained in consequence of the dishonesty on the part of a solicitor is proved "to the satisfaction of the Council" a grant may be made "if the Council thinks fit". This provision was in turn substantially re-enacted by section 36 of the Solicitors Act 1974 which omitted the phrase "if the Council thinks fit" and simply stated that the Society "may make a grant" of the purpose of relieving such loss.

[10] The current Scottish statutory provisions are in section 43 of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980, which provides inter alia as follows:-

"Protection of clients

Guarantee Fund

43. - (1) There shall be a fund to be called "The Scottish Solicitors Guarantee Fund" (in this Act referred to as "the Guarantee Fund"), which shall be vested in the Society and shall be under the control and management of the Council.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this section and of Schedule 3 the Guarantee Fund shall be held by the Society for the purpose of making grants in order to compensate persons who in the opinion of the Council suffer pecuniary loss by reason of dishonesty on the part of

(a) any solicitor, registered foreign lawyer or registered European lawyer in practice in the United Kingdom, or any employee of such solicitor, registered foreign lawyer or registered European lawyer in connection with the practice of the solicitor, registered foreign lawyer or registered European lawyer, whether or not he had a practising certificate in force when the act of dishonesty was committed, and notwithstanding that subsequent to the commission of that act he may have died or had his name removed from or struck off the roll or may have ceased to practise or been suspended from practice; or

(b) any incorporated practice or any director, manager, secretary or other employee of an incorporated practice, notwithstanding that subsequent to the commission of that act it may have ceased to be recognised under section 34(1A) or have been wound up.

(3) No grant may be made under this section -

(a) in respect of a loss made good otherwise;

(b) in respect of a loss which in the opinion f the Council has arisen while the solicitor was suspended from practice;

(c) to a solicitor or his representatives in respect of a loss suffered by him or them in connection with his practice as a solicitor by reason of dishonesty on the part of a partner or employee of his;

(cc) to an incorporated practice or any director or member thereof in respect of a loss suffered by it or him by reason of dishonesty on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other employee of the incorporated practice in connection with the practice;

(d)   unless an application for a grant is made to the Society in such manner, and with such period after the date on which the loss first came to the knowledge of the applicant, as may be prescribed by rules made under Schedule 3;

(e)    in respect of any default of a registered European lawyer, or any of his employees or partners, where such act or default takes place outside Scotland, unless the Council is satisfied that the act or default is closely connected with the registered European lawyer's practice in Scotland;

(f)     in respect of any act or default of a registered foreign lawyer, or any of his employees or partners, where such act or default takes place outside Scotland, unless the Council is satisfied that the act or default is closely connected with the registered foreign lawyer's practice, or any of his partners' practice, in Scotland; or

(g)    in respect of any act or default of any member, director, manager, secretary or other employee of an incorporated practice which is a multi-national practice, where such act or default takes place outside Scotland, unless the Council is satisfied that the act or default is closely connected with the incorporated practice's practice in Scotland.

(4) The decision of the Council with respect to any application for a grant shall be final.

(5) The Council may refuse to make a grant, or may make a grant only to a limited extent, if they are of opinion that there has been negligence on the part of the applicant or of any person for whom he is responsible which has contributed to the loss in question.

(6) The Council or any committee appointed by them may administer oaths for the purpose of inquiry into any matters which affect the making or refusal of a grant from the Guarantee Fund.

(7) Part I of Schedule 3 shall have effect with respect to the Guarantee Fund, including the making of contributions thereto by solicitors and the administration and management of the Fund by the Council;"

 

[11] Part 1 of Schedule 3 to the 1980 Act makes provision for payment of annual contributions to the Guarantee Fund by practising solicitors and for the investment of monies held therein. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 3 enables the Council to make procedural rules in relation to the form of application for a grant, and other related matters to give effect to the provisions of section 43 and include "any matters incidental, ancillary or supplementary to those provisions or concerning the administration, management, or protection of the Guarantee Fund".

 

Factual Background

[12] The first Petitioner ("Mr Billig") is an experienced businessman, residing in London. In the late eighties or early nineties, he retired from the property business and began to make short term loans at high rates of interest to persons who had urgent need of finance. Initially, he lent to friends and acquaintances. He engaged the services of an English solicitor, a Mr Ogus of Anthony Oberman & Co. The petitioners subsequently sued that firm (unsuccessfully) for damages for professional negligence arising out of inter alia the transactions with which the Council's Decision is concerned. Mr Ogus prepared the necessary loan and security documentation. Sometimes the loans were unsecured. Mr Billig first began to make loans based on solicitors' undertakings in about March 1992. He was concerned about proceeding in this way but, according to Mr Billig, Mr Ogus reassured him he would be adequately covered and could look to the Law Society for repayment of the loan and interest (7/12 paragraphs 1-10 (Mr Billig's Proof of Evidence in the professional negligence action)). That Proof of Evidence also noted that no loan documentation was ever prepared by Mr Ogus in relation to any of the loans where reliance was placed on a solicitor's undertaking; the reason being, according to the Proof of Evidence, that if loan documents were prepared, this would make the borrowing company primarily liable, with the undertakings effectively becoming guarantees rather than undertakings given in the course of a solicitor's business (7/12 paragraph 19, page 12). When Mr Billig first began to make loans, loan documentation was prepared and a security was usually taken over property owned by the borrower (ibid paragraphs 1‑4).

[13] In about October 1992, Mr Billig was introduced by a friend to a man named Griffin. Griffin was selling properties to a company named Braundsway Investments Ltd (Braundsway). Mr Mullen was Braundsway's solicitor. The loan was required to pay a deposit of 10% of the purchase price. Mr Billig agreed to consider lending and instructed Mr Ogus, who spoke to Mr Mullen (the detail is set out in a statement of Mr Ogus relating to Mr Mullen's prosecution (page 2) - 7/7) and a Mr Berger, who was Mr Griffin's solicitor. Mr Mullen provided Mr Ogus with details of the underlying transaction and informed him that moneys being borrowed to purchase the properties would be available to repay the loan, when the loan became due on 23 November 1992. Mr Mullen told Mr Ogus that he was satisfied that the transactions would be completed and that he appreciated the consequences for him if they were not. Mr Ogus confirmed with the Law Society of Scotland that Mr Mullen had a practising certificate. Mr Billig was very suspicious and wary about making the advance as Scotland was a "complete unknown quantity" to him; however, he proceeded; excellent interest rates were being offered (7/12 page 7 paragraph 11). A form of undertaking was negotiated between Ogus and Mullen, which Mullen signed and delivered to Ogus. It is in the following terms:-

"Dear Sirs,

In consideration of your client, John Billig, lending to our clients Braundsway Investments (UK) Limited the sum of £50,000 we hereby irrevocably and unconditionally undertake to repay to you on behalf of your client the said sum of £50,000 within 42 days of the date hereof together with interest thereon and a facility fee of £7,000. For the avoidance of doubt in the event that such sum is repaid earlier than the said 42 days fro the date hereof the full amount of £57,000 will nevertheless be paid to you.

 

If for any reason we have not fully paid to you the aforementioned sum of £57,000 within the aforementioned period of 42 days we shall be liable for and shall pay to you the sum of £4,000 for each period of 4 weeks or part thereof that the loan or any part remains unpaid together with all accrued interest and the said facility fee."

 

[14] On 28 October 1992, the second petitioners ("Allied Sterling") made a loan of £100,000 to Braundsway repayable by 19 November 1992. Mr Ogus again spoke to Mr Mullen and received confirmation that there was an underlying transaction for which the loan was required and in which Mr Mullen was instructed. Mr Ogus took advice from the Law Society of England and Wales as to the value of solicitors' undertakings and received confirmation that the advice which he had tendered to his client at an earlier date was correct. The petitioners do not aver in article 6(3) of the Statement of Facts or elsewhere, what that advice was but in his Proof of Evidence in the action against Mr Ogus's firm (see below at paragraph [19]) (paragraph 19 page 12 of 7/12 of process) Mr Billig states that had he been advised prior to making the loans that the right to claim reimbursement from the English Compensation Fund or the Guarantee Fund was not automatic and that he would not be fully protected by the undertakings he would never have agreed to make the advances based on the solicitors' undertakings. An undertaking, dated 28 October 1992, in respect of this loan was given by Mr Mullen in the following terms:-

"Dear Sirs,

 

ALLIED STERLING PLC - BRAUNDSWAY INVESTMENTS (UK) LTD

 

In consideration of your clients, Allied Sterling Plc, lending to our clients, Braundsway Investments (UK) Limited, the sum of £100,000, we hereby irrevocably and unconditionally undertake to repay to you on behalf of your clients the said sum of £100,000 within 21 days of the date hereof together with interest thereon and a facility fee of £17,000.00. For the avoidance of doubt in the event that such sum is repaid earlier than the said 21 days from the date hereof the full amount of £117,000.00 will nevertheless be paid to you.

 

If for any reason we have not fully paid to you the aforementioned sum of £117,000.00 within the aforementioned period of 21 days we shall be liable for and shall pay to you the sum of £17,000 for each period of 21 days or part thereof that the loan or any part remains unpaid together with all accrued interest and the said facility fee.

 

We confirm that we are dealing with various property matters on behalf of this client and in giving this undertaking we are entirely satisfied that we shall be in a position to honour the same and make the payment out of the surplus of funds being made available to my clients secured against properties currently being purchased prior to the aforementioned repayment date.

 

We confirm that we do not have any interest in or connection with our said clients other than the usual Solicitor and client relationship."

 

[15] There is now no dispute that Mr Mullen issued these letters of undertaking dishonestly. The loans were not repaid by Braundsway. Mr Mullen was unable to meet the undertakings from his own resources. He was sequestrated on 12 November 1992 (7/4). His liabilities exceeded his assets by about £345,000 (7/4). The petitioners aver (article 6(5)) that the loans were advanced in reliance on Mr Mullen but have not been repaid. Mullen dishonoured the undertakings.

[16] The petitioners made various attempts to recover their losses. They obtained decrees against Mullen at Glasgow Sheriff Court having raised an action against him in December 1992, but have recovered nothing from his sequestrated estate (7/3).

[17] In December 1992, a complaint was lodged with the Law Society of Scotland against Mr Mullen (7/2). In January 1993, Messrs Wright Johnston & Mackenzie, solicitors, Glasgow, intimated, on behalf of the petitioners, a possible claim on the Guarantee Fund (6/6). The Law Society's initial view, expressed later that month was that the claim did not appear to be a matter for the Guarantee Fund (6/7). A Preliminary Notice of Loss on the Law Society of Scotland's Form A was lodged on behalf of each petitioner in February 1993 (6/8). The whole matter appeared to lie in abeyance for some years while Mullen was prosecuted for fraud at Newcastle Crown Court (6/9 and 6/10).

[18] On 28 July 1993, however, Mr Mullen appeared before the Scottish Solicitors' Discipline Tribunal. He was found guilty of professional misconduct in that inter alia he continued to grant letters of undertaking when he ought to have known that it was unlikely that he would be able to honour the same. Mullen had also granted similar undertakings in other transactions in which the petitioners had no interest. The Tribunal concluded that Mr Mullen had acted in a reckless and irresponsible way in issuing, among others, the undertakings in favour of the petitioners (7/5 page 088). He was suspended from practice for a period of three years (7/5).

[19] The Petitioners sued Messrs Anthony Oberman & Co for professional negligence in the High Court in London but that action failed. Mr Billig's "Proof of Evidence" has been produced (7/12). This is essentially a signed precognition. At paragraph 5 he stated that Ogus told him that he would be adequately covered by the solicitors' undertaking and could look to the Law Society for repayment of the loan and interest. He notes at paragraph 9 that as he increased the number of loans and the value of the individual loans, he continued to raise with Mr Ogus the question of the adequacy of the undertakings; he said that the response of Ogus was always to assure him that there was no problem and that he was sufficiently protected. Mr Billig also stated in his Proof of Evidence that Ogus never mentioned any conditions which would have to be satisfied in order to recover the money from the Law Society. The question of instructing counsel for advice on the validity of solicitors' undertakings was raised with Ogus (paragraph 10 of the Proof of Evidence). Later in his Proof of Evidence, he records that the Law Society of Scotland had been contacted who verified that Mullen had a practising certificate. (paragraph 11, page 7); he states that although he was very suspicious and wary about making the advance as Scotland was a complete unknown quantity, excellent interest rates were being offered (ibid). He stated that he raised his concerns with Ogus on very many occasions about accepting solicitors' undertakings, but on each occasion he was reassured that there was no problem and that the undertakings afforded full protection in the event that the loans were not repaid (paragraph 19). In his judgment dated 8 March 1994 (7/8) Evans-Lombe J examined the facts and circumstances relating to the petitioners' dealings with Mullen in some detail. The following matters are recorded in that judgment, which counsel treated as the Judgment; it is described as a draft but no further or corrected judgment has been referred to in the proceedings before me:-

(1) The proceedings considered the two loans involving Mr Mullen and a third loan involving a company named Victoria Trust Limited and a solicitor named Kilner; Mullen was not involved in that transaction.

(2) Mr Billig began lending to friends, then acquaintances, then to borrowers introduced by such acquaintances. The loans were for short periods, at short notice and at high rates of interest and usually secured by mortgage (pages 2-3).

(3) Mr Billig first lent in March 1992 on the strength of only a solicitor's undertaking (page 5). He was concerned about the value of such undertakings and sought advice from Mr Ogus (pages 8-9; and see also pages 14-15).

(4) In relation to the Braudsway loans, Mr Ogus contacted the Law Society of Scotland who confirmed that Mr Mullen held a practising certificate and that he had paid his dues to a be a "member of the Scottish Indemnity Fund" (page 12). There is no indication in the judgment that advice from a Scottish solicitor was taken as to the nature and value of the undertaking in question or the prudence of accepting one as the sole form of security. Mr Ogus did, however, consult the English Law Society (page 15).

(5) The petitioners' case was inter alia that Mr Ogus advised that if the loan were not repaid the petitioners would be adequately covered by the solicitor's undertakings, which were usually given in the ordinary course of their business, and could look to the Law Society for repayment of the loan and interest; and that he failed to point out the weakness of such an undertaking as security (pages 5and 23). Mr Billig apparently thought that such a solicitor's undertaking was the equivalent of a bank guarantee. The position of Mr Ogus was, however, that his advice was that if the undertakings were given in the normal course of a solicitor's business, and the solicitor defaults, then the Compensation Fund would normally pay the amount due if the solicitor was fraudulent; and the Solicitor's indemnity Fund would pay if the solicitor was negligent (page 6).

(6) Mr Ogus negotiated the form of undertakings with Mr Mullen (page 13).

(7) In relation to the Victoria Trust Ltd loan, a similar form of undertaking was given by the English solicitor (named Kilner) for the borrower, another sole practitioner. No financial checks were made about the borrower (pages 17-21 generally and 20 in particular).

(8) Evans-Lombe J accepted Mr Ogus's version of the advice given (pages 25-26) and held that it was not negligent (page 34). He found it intrinsically unlikely that Mr Ogus was not aware of the weaknesses of solicitors' undertakings as security for advances (page 26). The petitioners led no expert evidence to support their contentions (page 37).

(9) Evans-Lombe J also found that the scope of Mr Ogus's retainer in relation to each loan transaction was to draw the documents recording each transaction of loan and the security for repayment. In particular, his duty was to ensure that the undertakings were in a form which rendered them enforceable as such (pages 35-36). It was not his duty to review the commercial standing of the transactions themselves, or the financial strength of the borrower or the value of the solicitors' undertakings (page 36). Nor was it his duty having been informed of the existence of underlying transactions, to make further enquiries unless he had been alerted to facts which ought reasonably to have made him suspicious (page 37). He concluded that Mr Billig was an experienced businessman conducting the business of lending money to those who were either not able to obtain loans from other sources or who wanted money quickly and in circumstances which did not give much opportunity to the lenders' advisers to take steps to ensure that the transaction involved the minimum risk to the lender. The consequent risk element in the business was thus reflected in the very substantial rates of interest and charges obtainable (pages 43-44).

(10) Evans-Lombe J was also of the view that had separate Scottish advice been obtained it was unlikely that it would have affected the conduct of the parties in any way (page 43). So far as appears from the judgment there was no evidence of Scots law or practice.

[20] An action of damages for fraudulent misrepresentation was raised against Mr Mullen by the petitioners in the High Court in London in about August 1996 (7/6). Judgment in default was granted in June 1997 (7/6). The petitioners have made no recovery under the judgment.

[21] By that stage, Mullen had been prosecuted at Newcastle for fraud in relation inter alia the 28 October 1992 undertaking but not it appears in relation to the 12 October 1992 undertaking (see 6/25 paragraph 25). The trial took place at Teeside Crown Court in October and November 1995. An extract of the proceedings was before the Council (7/9). The extract discloses that Mr Mullen gave evidence. He narrates, in chief, how he came to speak to Mr Ogus (page 189-191) who asked about the funding of the project; he describes the arrangements being made for the loans. He acknowledged his responsibility for meeting the undertakings (page 196), and explained that he did not know whether his clients had been duped or whether they had duped him (197). An extract from the Judge's Charge to the Jury is also produced but I was not referred to that document (205‑212). Mullen was, in November 1995, found not guilty of all charges relating to the petitioners (7/2 - letter dated 20 May 1996). By letter dated 19 January 1996 (6/10) to the petitioners' solicitors, the Chief Accountant of the Law Society of Scotland intimated that it was "clear that the funds were not received by Messrs Mullen & Co in the conduct of his practice" and intimated that he would be recommending rejection of the petitioners' claims. Further correspondence ensued for several years.

[22] The second petitioner's application in relation to the Victoria Trust Ltd transaction for a grant from the Compensation Fund administered by the Law Society of England and Wales was successful. A cheque for £146,118.75 was received in September 1996, which comprised the amount misappropriated by the solicitor Kilner. Reasonable costs of some £67,000 were also paid out of the Compensation Fund (6/28 and 6/29).

[23] Formal applications for a grant were lodged with the Law Society of Scotland in about April 1998 (7/38 of process). By letter to the petitioners' solicitors dated 6 April 1999 (6/13), the Chief Accountant stated that the Guarantee Fund Committee was not satisfied that evidence had been produced to demonstrate that the petitioners' loss was caused by the dishonesty of a solicitor. However, on 5 August 1999, the applications were considered by the Guarantee Fund Committee. On 13 August 1999 (6/15), the petitioners were informed that claims had been rejected on the basis that there was no evidence produced which demonstrated that the loss arose from dishonest actings on the part of Mr Mullen. On 27 August 1999 the Council approved the recommendation of the Guarantee Fund Committee and rejected the applications on the grounds that there was no evidence produced of any dishonesty on the part of Mr Mullen, which placed the claim within the scope of section 43 of the 1980 Act (see letter dated 17 September 1999; 6/16).

[24] The petitioners then applied to this Court for judicial review of the Council's decision (RB2/G). The Council lodged Answers in defence of its decision but at the first Hearing on 16 June 2000, the Council consented to reduction of its decision. Thereafter, further correspondence ensued. Written submissions and documents were lodged with the Council. These included a witness statement by the first petitioner dated 28 February 2001 (7/12) setting out his position in relation to his lending business and solicitors' undertakings. I was not referred to this document.

[25] Progress was slow. On 11 July 2002, the petitioners, represented by English counsel, and English and Scottish solicitors appeared before a Panel appointed by the Guarantee Fund Committee to review the papers, receive representations and to report to the Committee (RB2/A & B). The petitioners lodged further written submissions in October 2002 (RB2/C). The Guarantee Fund Committee met in October and December 2002 (RB2/D&E) but again concluded that Mr Mullen had not acted dishonestly. The lengthy Minute of the Guarantee Fund Committee's meeting held on 5 December 2002 (also in 6/25) was not referred to at all by counsel in their submissions to me. I do not, therefore consider this Minute further, beyond noting the lengthy list, in paragraph 1, of documents which were before the Committee. Eventually, following the production of further information the Council concluded on 30 May 2003 that on the balance of probabilities there had been dishonesty on the part of Mr Mullen. The applications were remitted to the Guarantee Fund Committee for further consideration.

[26] The Guarantee Fund Committee met in June 2003 (RB2/H) and July 2003 (RB2/J) August 2003. They recommended rejection of the applications on the basis that (i) the Council had a discretion whether or not to make a payment from the Guarantee Fund, and (ii) these applications were not the sort of applications which called for a grant from the Guarantee Fund. The Council met in November 2003 (RB2/T). It acknowledged that the petitioners had suffered pecuniary loss, that the claims were being made on the Guarantee Fund as a last resort, that the transactions at the centre of the claims had been in connection with a solicitors' business, and that there had been dishonesty on the part of Mr Mullen. The Council noted that there appeared to be no policy in relation to the consideration of claims made against the Guarantee Fund; instead, each claim was considered on its merits. The Council remitted matters to the Guarantee Fund Committee to consider all aspects of the claims (RB2/T - Council Minute of Meeting held on 28 November 2003).

[27] The Committee met once more in February 2004 (RB2/W- Minute of Meeting). It was of the view that the claims did not have "the characteristics of the sort of case which deserved payment of a grant from the Guarantee Fund". They concluded that the petitioners' loss was caused by their "own carelessness and negligence in not making financial checks on the relevant parties". The Committee considered that the petitioners were "entirely responsible for their loss". They considered that no payment of grant was appropriate. The petitioners' English solicitors wrote a lengthy letter to the Council's solicitors (Brodies) criticising in considerable detail, the content of the Committee's Minute (RB2/X; 7/35 and 6/27). Some of those criticisms were reflected in the submissions made to me by counsel for the petitioners.

[28] The applications were finally considered by the Council at a meeting on 30 April 2004. The petitioners had intimated further detailed written submissions in advance of the meeting (7/39, 7/40). Scottish junior counsel, attended by Scottish and English solicitors, addressed the Council. The applications were rejected once again.

[29] The Minutes of the Council meeting held on 30 April 2004 (6/2 of process) record that decision. Their whole terms are of some importance.

[30] It is recorded in the Minutes inter alia that (i) counsel for the petitioners submitted that (a) the key issue was whether there was negligence (i.e. a failure to take reasonable care in relation to one's own affairs) on the part of the claimants with respect to the loss they had sustained due to the dishonesty of Mr Mullen; (b) there was no such negligence; (c) the Council had therefore no residuary discretion to refuse a grant; (d) there being no such negligence a full grant had to be made; (e) if there was a finding of negligence the Council would also have to consider whether that negligence contributed to the petitioners' losses; (f) the petitioners cannot be said to have acted unreasonably by relying on a solicitor's undertaking, and their solicitor had no duty to look behind Mr Mullen's undertaking; (g) the Council could only find the applicants negligent if no reasonably careful person would have relied on an undertaking given by a Scottish solicitor as had been given by Mr Mullen; the implication of such a conclusion was that it would be unreasonable to rely on an undertaking given by a Scottish solicitor; and (h) on quantum, grants which included interest at the judicial rate plus costs should be made; (ii) the Convenor of the Guarantee Fund Committee spoke to the recommendation contained within the Minute of the Guarantee Fund Committee meeting held on 6 February 2004 (7/34; Respondents' Bundle Volume 2 tab W (RB2/W)); he noted that the advice received by the Committee was that the Council had a (residual) discretion to refuse a grant; he noted that it was necessary to examine the actings of Billig and Allied Sterling; he noted that the undertakings given by Mr Mullen were "extremely unusual" and concluded that the claims should be rejected; (iii) the Council considered the key issue to be whether the petitioners had or had not contributed to their loss due to their negligence; and (iv) the Council considered that the undertakings were written in such terms that "no reasonable Scottish solicitor would have given". Having "aired" the above matters, the Minutes proceeded as follows:-

"CLAIMS BY ALLIED STERLING plc AND JOHN BILLIG AGAINST MULLEN & CO

 

1. Attendance

 

Council AGREED that the shorthand writer Catherine McCuish of William Hodge attend the first part of the meeting on the above subject matter for the duration of the applicant's legal advisers' oral submissions to Council. Council also AGREED that the Society's solicitor Robin Macpherson attend the meeting for the duration of the full debate on these claims.

 

Council first considered whether the former Convener of the Guarantee Fund Committee and other members of that Committee should absent themselves from the Council deliberations with respect to the claims from Allied Sterling plc and John Billig. Council AGREED that there were no reasons why a member of the Guarantee Fund Committee should not sit in Council and contribute to the debate on these claims. Council members should only absent themselves from the meeting if they had a direct personal interest in the claims which was not the case.

 

Council also AGREED that it was essential that former and current Guarantee Fund Committee members who had a detailed knowledge of the claims make their knowledge and experience available to the Council.

 

It was the unanimous will of the Council that the former Guarantee Fund Committee Convener attend and participate in this part of the Council meeting.

 

The Council had received and considered a file of papers containing, amongst other things, copies of documentation forwarded by the applicants in support of their claims and notes and copies of representations made by them.

 

The legal representatives for Allied Sterling plc and John Billig joined the meeting - 10.15am.

 

The claimants Allied Sterling plc and John Billig were represented by James Wolffe, Advocate, Douglas Russell of Simpson & Marwick and Grenville Reeves of Andrew Jay & Co. Mr. Wolffe spoke on behalf of the applicants.

 

No Council member had any interest to declare in the proceedings.

 

2. Applicants' Submissions - General

 

Mr. Wolffe stated that the key issue which required to be addressed was whether there was negligence on the part of the claimants with respect to the loss they had sustained due to the dishonesty of Mr. Mullen. Mr. Wolffe stated that he would argue that there was no basis for finding contributory negligence by the applicants and if that was the case the Council of the Law Society of Scotland by law has no discretion in the matter and must grant the applicants their full award of compensation. He contended that it is only where there is contributory negligence that the Council can exercise its discretion in determining the size of the award to make to any applicant.

 

Mr. Wolffe reminded Council of the statutory provisions with respect to the Guarantee Fund which are set out in Section 43 of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980. Mr. Wolffe reminded Council that in terms of Section 43(5) of the 1980 Act that the Council:-

 

'may refuse to make a grant, or make a grant, only to a limited extent, if they are of the opinion that there has been negligence on the part of the applicant or of any other person for whom he is responsible which has contributed to the loss in question.'

 

Mr. Wolffe emphasised that it is only where there had been contributory negligence on the part of the applicants, in those limited circumstances that the Council can either refuse to make a grant or limit the size of the grant. Mr. Wolffe stated that if Parliament had wished to grant the Council a general discretion, the wording in Section 43 of the 1980 Act would have been different and would likely have been used on the wording in Section 36 of the Solicitors Act 1974. It is this Act which establishes and governs the operation of the Compensation Fund of the Law Society of England and Wales and under that Act the Council of the Law Society of England and Wales is given the general discretion in making awards from its compensation fund.

 

Mr Wolffe stated that if Council decided that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the applicants then Council was bound to make the full grant from the Guarantee Fund which the applicants sought in their claims. However, Mr. Wolffe stated that if Council decided there was contributory negligence by the applicants in terms of Section 43(5) of the 1980 Act, in order to bring such contributory negligence into play, the Council would have to make two findings. First, Council would have to decide that there was negligence on the part of the applicant and second, that the applicants' negligence contributed to the loss in question. Mr. Wolffe defined negligence as a failure by the applicants to act with reasonable care in relation to their own affairs.

 

Mr. Wolffe then outlined to Council the circumstances which had led to the losses suffered by the applicants. The applicants were involved in providing loans to clients of Mullen & Co. The applicants' monies had been advanced on the reliance of undertakings given by Mr. Mullen. Mr. Mullen had given written undertakings to Ian Ogus, Solicitor on behalf of Mr. Ogus's client John Billig one of the applicants and Allied Sterling plc the other applicant. The loans advanced were in relation to property transactions in which Mr. Mullen had been instructed.

 

The English solicitor acting for the applicants had been told by Mr. Mullen that there were underlying property transactions which would secure the money borrowed and that there would be funds to repay the loans at the end of the transaction. It was against this background that the applicants made the loans based on the undertakings from Mr. Mullen.

 

Mr. Wolffe directed Council to page 151 of the papers which recorded that Mr. Mullen had confirmed that there was an underlying transaction for which the loan, as advanced by the applicants, was required and in which he (Mr. Mullen) was instructed. Noted that Mr Ogus had negotiated with Mr. Mullen the form of the latter's undertaking. Mr. Wolffe emphasised to Council that the nature of the transactions between the applicants and Mr. Mullen was important as a lender, he argued, cannot be said to have acted unreasonably if a lender had relied on a solicitor's undertaking. A lender should not be expected to look to a borrower for the repayment of a loan if the lender had been told by the solicitor acting for the borrower that repayment of the loan will be made from funds available from the underlying property transaction. Mr. Wolffe stated that the applicants correctly believed that a solicitor would not give an undertaking, as Mr. Mullen had, unless there were funds available to repay the loan, any lender must reasonably have confidence in such an undertaking where it is given.

 

Mr. Wolffe then drew Council's attention to page 174 of the papers and advised Council that the applicants' solicitors had no duty to look behind Mr. Mullen's undertaking. Mr. Wolffe therefore argued that the Council could only find the applicants negligent if no reasonably careful person would have relied on an undertaking given by a Scottish solicitor as had been given by Mr. Mullen. The broader implication of such a decision by the Council would be that in future it would be unreasonable to rely on an undertaking given by a Scottish solicitor without looking beyond that undertaking to the credit worthiness of the solicitor or his clients.

 

Mr. Wolffe stated that to suggest that a person should have to check on the credit worthiness of a solicitor when such solicitor provides an undertaking is not a course of action which would be regarded as either normal or reasonable. Mr. Wolffe also stated that it was not reasonable, as had been suggested, that Mr. Mullen's relative inexperience as a solicitor and the fact that he was a sole practitioner should have any bearing on the question of whether there was any contributorily negligence on behalf of the applicant. To suggest otherwise could imply that the undertakings given by a sole practitioner or relatively junior solicitor should be relied on to a lesser extent than undertakings given by other solicitors.

 

Mr. Wolffe advised Council that on the basis of this analysis it would be wrong for the Council to assert that the applicants were contributorily negligent and that the Council should therefore make a full grant from the Guarantee Fund with respect to the applicants' claims for compensation. However, if Council concluded that the applicants were contributorily negligent while Council did have a discretion in such circumstances this discretion had to be applied fairly. Thus it was argued that as the undertakings given in the transactions were the real cause of the loss and the solicitor had given the undertakings dishonestly, and had there been no undertakings, the applicants would not have provided their loans, the Council should therefore grant the applicants' request for compensation.

 

Mr. Wolffe concluded the submissions by stating that the applicants had relied on the dishonest undertakings of Mr. Mullen and had not contributed by their negligence to their loss were therefore justified in having their requests for compensation paid in full. For the Council to fail to make a grant for compensation from the Guarantee Fund would leave the applicants in no better position than a client who had had their funds stolen by a dishonest solicitor.

 

3. Applicants' Submission - Quantum

 

Mr. Wolffe then turned to the issue of quantum and advised that Mr. Billig was seeking the principal sum of £50,000 plus interest plus costs and that Allied Sterling plc were seeking the principal sum of £100,000 plus interest plus costs - these two principal sums being the monies originally advanced on the basis of the dishonest undertakings by Mr. Mullen. The interest which the applicants were seeking was interest at the judicial rate as the applicants had been deprived of the use of their monies for over 11 years. Mr. Wolffe also advised Council that the applicants had incurred costs in pursuing Mr. Ogus and Mr. Mullen as well as pursuing their claims under the Guarantee Fund. The grants which the applicants sought from the Guarantee Fund were in respect of the loss of the principal sum plus interest at the judicial rate plus costs in terms of paragraph 4, Schedule 3 of the 1980 Act. Mr. Wolffe advised Council that the applicants, through their legal advisers, could at a later date provide the exact sums of interest and costs which were sought as these sums were not currently available.

 

The applicants' legal team left the meeting together with the shorthand writer - 10.55am.

 

4. Council's Deliberations

 

Council noted that the applicants' solicitors had made their oral representations to Council within the one hour allotted and AGREED by Council at a previous meeting.

 

The Guarantee Fund Committee Convener then spoke to the recommendation within the Guarantee Fund Committee Minute of 6th February 2004.

 

The Convener advised Council that the circumstances of the applications for an award of compensation from the Guarantee Fund were unique and very complicated. Noted that legal advice had been sought at each stage of the proceedings. The Committee had received Opinions from three leading QCs as well as advice from the Society's solicitors, Brodies, on the applicants' claims. The Convener reminded Council that claims which go to the Guarantee Fund are dealt with in a staged process where four questions have to be answered. These four questions are:-

 

1. Has pecuniary loss been suffered?

 

2. Has there been dishonesty by solicitors?

 

3. Is the dishonesty by the solicitors in connection with a solicitor's practice?

 

4. Is the claim against the Guarantee Fund - a claim of last resort?

 

The Convener advised Council that the answers to all of the above questions with respect to the claims before the Council meeting today were all 'yes'. The Convener then reminded Council of the statutory provisions in relation to grants from the Guarantee Fund under Section 43 of the 1980 Act.

 

The Convener stated that it was the applicants' position that the Council has no discretion in making grants from the Guarantee Fund under Section 43 where dishonesty of a solicitor has been proved other than under Section 43(5). The advice which the Guarantee Fund Committee has received is that the Society does have discretion in making grants from the Guarantee Fund. This advice is set out on pages 415, 420, 431 and 445 of the Opinions provided to the Guarantee Fund Committee over the course of its consideration of the claims. Furthermore, the Convener argued that the very use of the term 'grant' implies a discretion on the part of the Society and that awards from the Guarantee Fund are not guaranteed even if dishonesty has been established. Awards from the Guarantee Fund relate to compensation and not restitution.

 

The Convener drew Council's attention to the advice contained at pages 416 and 450 in the papers before Council which refuted the applicants' suggestion that the issue of the exercise of discretion had in some way been 'dreamt up' by the Guarantee Fund Committee. The Convener accepted that while there was no judicial authority in Scotland on the issue of payments from the Guarantee Fund, the issue had been considered in a number of English cases albeit that they were applying the English legislation which is differently worded. The issue of the Guarantee Fund's discretion was also clearly narrated in the Opinion from the late David Williamson, QC., at page 450.

 

Contributory Negligence

 

The Convener then turned to the terms of Section 43(5) and whether the applicants were negligent. Noted that a definition of negligence is provided in the Opinion at page 422 where it is described as a lack of reasonable care. The Convener then advised Council that it was necessary in making an assessment of the applicants' negligence to look at the actings of Mr. Billig and his company Allied Sterling plc. The Convener drew Council's attention to pages 248 and 253 of the papers where Mr. Billig states that no loan documentation had been prepared with respect to the loans provided to the clients of Mr. Mullen. Mr. Billig stated 'Although I was very suspicious and wary about making the advance as Scotland was a complete unknown quantity to me, excellent interest rates were being offered.' The absence of any loan documentation should be taken as evidence of the negligence of the applicants with respect to the loss they had suffered.

 

Procedure

 

The Convener then addressed the issue of the Guarantee Fund Committee's procedures in dealing with the claims. Again the Convener emphasised to Council that in each step of the Committee's proceedings legal advice had been sought and obtained. Furthermore the applicants had previously been given an opportunity to be heard and make oral representations. There had been delays in the proceedings but a number of these delays were due to the applicants wishing to make further representations and obtain further advice.

 

The Convener also reminded Council that it was extremely rare for solicitors to give personal undertakings and that the undertakings given by Mr. Mullen were extremely unusual.

 

The Convener concluded his remarks by advising the Council that based on both the written and oral submissions presented to Council, the claims by Mr. John Billig should be rejected and the claim by Allied Sterling plc should be rejected.

 

Council AGREED that there were no matters on which it required clarification from the legal team of Allied Sterling plc and John Billig.

 

Council aired a number of matters in its initial consideration of the submissions and documentary evidence as follows:-

 

·        AGREED that the claims could be fully considered and disposed of at the Council meeting as the key issue to determine was whether the applicants had or had not contributed to their loss due to their negligence. It was clear to many members of Council that the applicants had acted negligently with respect to the undertakings provided by Mr. Mullen as the applicants had neither consulted the Law Society of Scotland nor a Scottish solicitor for advice on the terms of Mr. Mullen's undertakings. It is also clear that Mr. Billig had acted negligently as from his statements within the papers he was suspicious of Mr. Mullen but as a result of those suspicions he had contacted an English solicitor for views on Mr. Mullen's undertaking who in turn contacted the Law Society of England and Wales. Furthermore it could be argued that Mr. Billig should have looked carefully at the terms of the undertaking provided by Mr. Mullen and had regard to his credit-worthiness as it was Mr. Billig's monies which were being lent. However Mr. Billig was only interested in 'the deal to be struck under the terms of the loan' due to the very good and exceptionally high interest rates to be applied to the loans. Mr. Billig had ignored all the warning signs and 'had shut his eyes to everything but the interest rates on the loans'. Mr. Billig had therefore acted in a negligent manner.

 

·        Council also AGREED that Mr. Billg and Allied Sterling plc should have looked at the exact terms of the letter of undertaking as it was written in such terms that no reasonable Scottish solicitor would have given. Given the very unusual terms and nature of Mr. Mullen's undertakings, any reasonable person would have made investigations to the appropriate Scottish authority and made the appropriate searches in order to look behind the undertakings. Mr. Billig and Allied Sterling plc had not done this and their failure to do so amounted to a lack of reasonable care.

 

Council AGREED to adjourn its consideration of the claims by Allied Sterling plc and John Billig against the Guarantee Fund to allow Sheila Spicer, Secretary to the Clementi Review of the Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in England and Wales, to give a presentation to Council - 12.10pm.

 

CLAIMS BY ALLIED STERLING plc AND JOHN BILLIG AGAINST MULLEN & CO

 

The Council continued its deliberations on the above matter - 12.55pm.

 

Council noted the following matters with respect to the written evidence and oral submissions:-

 

1.      Statutory Background

 

Section 43(5) of the 1980 Act is quite clear in that where the Council is of the opinion that there has been negligence on the part of an applicant or of any person for whom the applicant is responsible which has contributed to the loss in question Council can refuse to make a grant, or make a grant only to a limited extent.

 

2.      Absence of Loan Documentation

 

Council also AGREED that the applicants had been negligent in securing no loan documentation for the loans and in this context the undertakings given by Mr. Mullen could only be viewed as guarantees and not undertakings to be given in the course of his business. This point was strengthened on the basis of the papers which showed that it was Mr. Billig's regular practice to obtain the appropriate loan documentation. Further, the Council noted that it was a deliberate decision on the part of the lenders and their advisers not to prepare loan documentation. Council considered that the failure to obtain such loan documentation showed a lack of reasonable care in the whole circumstances of the undertakings relied on and had contributed to the losses.

 

3.      Extraordinary Nature of the Letters of Undertaking

 

Council AGREED that the undertakings given by Mr. Mullen were so exceptional and outwith the boundaries of any reasonable undertaking a Scottish solicitor would provide that any reasonable person would not have relied on such undertakings.

 

The form of words used in the undertakings, being so unusual and so unlikely to have been given by a Scottish solicitor, were probably drafted by Mr. Ogus and that it had only been signed by Mr. Mullen. There was therefore negligence on the part of the lenders - Mr. Billig and Allied Sterling plc as principals and Mr. Ogus as their solicitor, on the basis of a principal being responsible for the actings of his agent, and had contributed to their loss.

 

4.